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Abstract 
 
Interest organizations endeavor to influence government in ways that are 
beneficial for their stakeholders making their activities significant for both theoretical and 
practical reasons. This research examined the structure of the contemporary agricultural 
interest group community to explore theoretical questions about whether pluralism exists 
in agricultural policy making processes and whether agricultural interest groups create 
policy engagement niches. From a practical perspective, the project examined the 
contemporary federal agricultural interest group community to assess what groups 
participate and how. Lobbying disclosure data from the 112
th
 U.S. Congress was 
analyzed using descriptive statistics and cluster analysis, complemented by organizational 
interviews. Analysis indicated a few key findings: 1) agricultural policy encompassed a 
variety of issues but the domain had a strong focus on agricultural production and the 
environment; 2) the federal agricultural interest group community encompasses a large 
and diverse set of actors across a variety of interests and the majority of these groups 
were not considered farm organizations; 3) most of the organizations that engage federal 
agricultural policy are more specialized than general, but generalist groups are the most 
active of all organizations types; 4) the vast majority of interests engage in a limited 
fashion in the domain, which is simultaneously characterized by policy bandwagons and 
issue niches; 5) patterns of engagement by the overwhelming majority of interest groups 
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in the agricultural domain were similar, while a few of the 1,235 organizations in the 
community exhibited unique lobbying patterns carving out policy engagement niches; 6) 
interview responses indicated mixed results for the existence of niche partitioning 
behavior in the federal agriculture domain, aligning with patterns of lobbying in which a 
portion of organizations carved out unique niches, but the vast majority did not.  
These findings have implications for the niche theory of interest representation, including 
the competitive exclusion principle, and for understanding federal agricultural policy 
making processes.  
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
 
Interest organizations endeavor to influence government in ways that are 
beneficial for their stakeholders and as such their activities inherently “impinge[s] on 
questions of democracy and representation” (Halpin & Thomas 2012, p. 582).  For this 
reason, the activities of interest groups are significant for both their theoretical and 
practical implications. How do interest groups endeavor to influence policy? Are they 
effective? What does this influence mean for democratic ideals? All are questions 
conjured by critical thinking about interest groups’ role in American policy and politics. 
These same questions were the impetus for this research, particularly how they apply to 
contemporary agricultural policy in the United States.   
 Theoretically, some political science theories have linked interest organizations’ 
activities to the need to effectively use resources and establish unique identities (Browne 
1990; Gray & Lowery 1996). The niche theory of interest representation examines the 
structure of organized interest communities, emphasizing that “organized interests define 
themselves in terms of carefully constructed issue niches” due to competition for 
attention, support, and limited resources (Browne 1990, p. 477). Interest groups thus 
create unique niches that consist of specific policy agendas and resources in order to both 
more effectively influence policy and to survive as an organization (Gray & Lowery 
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1996). The implications of niche theory for interest communities include: 1) interest 
groups will partition the resources in a community in order to create unique realized 
niches; 2) interests with defined niches, will have a competitive advantage over other 
organizations when it comes to influence and organizational survival; 3) in order to 
survive and effectively influence policy, generalist organizations will begin to specialize 
in areas where they can realize a competitive advantage (Lowery et al., 2012). Looking 
specifically at influence over policy agendas, those groups with well-defined and specific 
niches have been found to be more effective in influencing policy than groups engaged in 
a broad range of issues (Browne 1990).         
 Practically, a thorough understanding of interest group communities can inform 
policy stakeholders and citizens. For instance, the information can point to who attempts 
to influence policies and in what ways and to the relationships between policy 
stakeholders. These factors can lead to a fuller understanding of policy making processes 
and outcomes.  
Federal agricultural policy covers a wide range of issues including nutrition, rural 
development, agricultural commodity programs, crop insurance, conservation and 
environmental programs, energy, and trade, among others (Johnson & Monke 2013). The 
wide impacts and the unique characteristics of the agricultural policy domain, including 
the fact that the domain is characterized by a wide range of issues and expectation of 
conflict is high (Browne 1990; Bonnen, Browne, and Schweikhardt 1996), make it an 
important case for understanding niche theory and the manner of interest group 
participation. And while niche theory was supported by research on agricultural policy in 
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the late 1980’s and early 1990’s, it is uncertain how the theory would apply to the 
contemporary agricultural policy domain. Contemporary federal agricultural policy has 
shifted toward more general policies, suggesting a high level of influence by generalist 
farm organizations (Wilson 2005; Reimer 2013). But perhaps more importantly, United 
States’ agriculture has changed in myriad ways since the late 1980’s and early 1990’s. 
The “great agricultural transition” outlined by Linda Lobao and Katherine Meyer (2001), 
characterized by declining numbers of farms, a declining farm population, greater 
reliance on hired labor, and growth in farm acreages, sales, and real estate capitalization, 
has continued and been exacerbated by new “discontinuous social forces” within the 21st 
century U.S. agro-food system (Buttel 2003).  
 This research examined niche theory through the lens of the contemporary federal 
agricultural policy domain. Not only did it address the relevance of the theory in the 
domain, but perhaps more importantly, it engaged a broader question regarding the 
existence of pluralism within the domain. Because “the generalized pluralist theme is that 
multiple interests…interacting together both inside and outside of government and 
effectively representing all components of a specific society…produce a democratic 
process for governing” (Browne 1990, p. 478), the implications of niche theory include 
questions regarding pluralism in democratic processes. While this research did not 
examine the complex issue of interest group influence or effectiveness, it provides a 
useful basis for later research to assess the relative influence and effectiveness of 
agricultural interest groups.        
 The project examined the structure of the contemporary agricultural interest group 
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community to explore theoretical questions about whether pluralism exists in agricultural 
policy making processes, whether agricultural interest groups create policy engagement 
niches, and how the competitive exclusion principle plays out in the domain. From a 
practical perspective, the project examined the agricultural interest group community to 
assess such questions as who participates, what is the manner of their participation, and 
how is agricultural policy characterized at the end of the first decade of the 21
st
 century? 
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Chapter 2: Pluralism, Niche Theory and Agriculture  
 
What is an interest group? 
Alexis de Tocqueville, in his classic piece Democracy in America, claimed, 
“Americans of all ages, all stations in life, and all types of disposition are forever forming 
associations” (Fiorina & Peterson 1998, p. 201). Interest groups represent one such form 
of association and political participation in the United States. Broadly defined, an interest 
group is an “organization or association of people with common interests that engages in 
politics on behalf of its members” (Fiorina, Peterson, Johnson & Voss 2004, p. 532). 
Scholars within sociology have defined these groups as “voluntary associations 
independent of the political system that attempt to influence the government” (Andrews 
& Edwards 2004, p. 481). A more specific definition by Wright (1993) claims interest 
groups are  
a collection of individuals or a group of individuals linked together by 
professional circumstance, or by common political, economic, or social interests, 
that meets the following requirements: 1) its name does not appear on an election 
ballot; 2) it uses some portion of its collective resources to try and influence 
decisions made by legislative, executive, or judicial branches of national, state, or 
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local governments; and 3) it is organized externally to the institution of 
government that it seeks to influence. (p.22-3)   
Within the social sciences, the two major lines of interest group research investigate 
group formation/maintenance and influence on government (Fiorina et al., 2004). 
Pluralism and Neopluralism   
 Beginning in the 1960’s, American political science was dominated by Robert 
Dahl’s pluralist perspective, which was foremost a theory of political power responding 
to C. Wright Mill’s power elite theory. The major thesis of pluralism was that American 
political processes were characterized by decentralized power in which political parties 
and elections played dominant roles. When pluralist perspectives were applied to interest 
group research, organizations were theorized to gain political power primarily from the 
resources and time donated to them by citizens (McFarland 2010). The idea that “those 
representing various private parties will in fact rationally mobilize their resources and 
play out their interests by active participation on some generally level field of contest,” 
(Browne 1990, p. 478) guided the assumption that political participation by multiple 
interests across a variety of societal groups ensured democratic governance. The major 
critique of pluralist theory—that it does not account for unequal capacities to organize 
and differential resource availability, leading to differential access and influence—lead to 
shifts in the dominant paradigm of interest group research in the 1970’s and 1980’s. 
Pluralism was replaced by a type of multiple-elite theory (Browne 1990; McFarland 
2010).  
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 Since the 1980’s, the dominant American political science paradigm in interest 
group research shifted yet again, to neopluralism. McFarland (2010) presents 
neopluralism as, 
accepting Dahl’s pluralism in finding power and interest 
groups in American politics to be held by multiple groups 
and individuals. But neopluralism is further defined as 
giving priority emphasis (unlike Dahl) to the existence of 
hundreds of policy issue areas, and to the finding that while 
many issues areas are characterized by a plurality of 
groups, some issues areas are elitist, ruled by a single 
coalition or perhaps having just a handful of influential 
groups. (p. 42) 
 According to Lowery & Gray (2004), a neopluralist perspective holds that groups 
representing a variety of interests will exist, contrary to Olson’s collective action 
problem, but that the mobilization of these various groups will be challenging. Rather 
than characterize neopluarlism as a single, coherent theory, Lowery and Gray (2004) 
identified characteristics common to the “gaggle of models” using a neopluralist 
perspective, including: 1) attentiveness to a wide range of interest group types, including 
institutions; 2) research that examines competition between group types in each aspect of 
influence, as opposed to other perspectives which take narrow views of competition; 3) 
greater focus on variation, such as in group context or tactics, that informs theory; 4) an 
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awareness of the connections between the stages of influence; 5) an acknowledgement 
that the stages of influence are not unidirectional, but show feedback. 
Niche Theory of Interest Representation  
 When Browne (1990) investigated interest group participation and interactions 
within agricultural policy in order to asses the implications for pluralist theory, he found 
that organized interests within the domain often had a narrow issue focus, they minimized 
issue based interaction, and they avoided commitment to coalitions. His findings 
suggested, “interest group politics is essentially about gaining elite status over a small 
range of issues” (p. 497). His explanation of the phenomena leaned on transactional 
theory; organizations and policymakers form relationships of exchange and 
organizations’ activities are constrained by the transaction costs associated with those 
exchanges. An interest group defined by a narrow policy ‘niche,’ or activity focusing on 
only a few issues, and with identifiable political assets like recognition has relatively few 
transaction costs. Essentially, “organized interests define themselves in terms of carefully 
constructed issue niches,” (p. 477) due to competition for attention and support from 
policy makers.   
 In the mid 1990’s, Virginia Gray and David Lowery expanded upon the niche 
theory of interest representation by applying population ecology concepts to interest 
group communities. While Browne’s conception of a niche only included “the external 
relationships between interest organization entrepreneurs and policymakers,” (Gray & 
Lowery 1996, p. 92) Gray and Lowery conceptualized a niche as the “multidimensional 
set of attributes of a population in relation to its environment” (p. 93). A fundamental 
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niche refers to the space in which an organization is able to survive. Species, or in this 
case, interest organizations, can have overlapping fundamental niches. According to 
population ecology research, increased ecological similarity between species leads to a 
decreased likelihood of coexistence because of resource competition. Thus, species that 
share a fundamental niche engage in resource partitioning behavior, or competition, until 
one displaces the other and they occupy distinct realized niches. This is known as the 
competitive exclusion principle.       
 Resource partitioning behavior refers largely to the interactions and relationships 
between species within a fundamental niche. Specifically, resource partitioning behavior 
is exhibited through competition, but not conflict or cooperation, between species. Thus, 
resource partitioning is the competitive behavior of a species to create a niche, which is 
created when the species occupies a distinct space, in reference to resource variables. 
When applied to interest groups, the niche theory leads to the idea that “The particular 
identity that an organization establishes—its realized niche—will be specified through 
how partitioning occurs of critical dimensions of the fundamental niche shared with 
competitors” (Gray & Lowery 1996, p. 95). 
 What then are critical resources for the creation of a viable interest group niche? 
Researchers hypothesize that these critical niche dimensions include: 1) members; 2) 
selective benefits in order to mobilize members; 3) finances or monetary resources; 4) 
access to policy making processes or policy engagement/activity); 5) existence of 
government action or proposed government action. Members refer to the individuals who 
are potential or actual members of an organization. Selective benefits are conceptualized 
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as those benefits or services offered by an organization in order to attract and mobilize 
members. Finances refer to the availability of funds to maintain an organization. Policy 
engagement or activity is conceptualized as formal contact with federal officials and can 
encompass both scope or breadth of engagement as well as intensity of activity (Gray & 
Lowery 1996; Halpin & Thomas 2012). This conceptualization of policy engagement 
leaves out other common forms of interest group activity, such as public campaigns, 
generating evidence and advice, grassroots mobilization, and others (Jones 2011; Fiorina 
et al., 2004). In addition, this conceptualization potentially leaves out other stages within 
the policy-making process that do not require contact with federal officials, such as issue 
framing and rule-making. The narrow scope of this conceptualization, which is also used 
in this research, is acknowledged as a limitation and should be built upon by future 
research. Finally, the existence of real or proposed government action refers to the 
existence of government policy or policy proposals on relevant topics for interest groups. 
Interest groups partition themselves on one or more of these dimensions in order to create 
a realized niche. 
 Initial research regarding the dimensions of an interest group niche indicated that 
partitioning was more common for internal resources, such as members and finances, 
than for policy access (Gray & Lowery 1996). However, later research found evidence 
suggesting that the critical dimensions of a niche include “isolation from conflict over 
policy,” which provides strong evidence in support of Browne’s (1990) emphasis on 
policy access and control for niche creation. Adequate sources of internal revenue and 
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membership are also important niche dimensions and it has been suggested that member 
benefits may be a less important resource dimension (Gray & Lowery 1997). 
 The competitive exclusion principle that is so central to population ecology theory 
has interesting implications for interest group communities. First, the principle indicates 
that interest organizations, especially those that are in densely populated communities, 
will engage in resource partitioning in order to create niches that allow them to more 
effectively survive and influence policy (Gray & Lowery 1996). A study by Halpin and 
Thomas (2012) examining policy activity specialization found overwhelmingly that 
interest groups tend to have narrow policy foci; however, the authors examined the 
domain focus of groups rather than their issue focus within one or more domains. A 2012 
study by Lowery, Gray, Kirkland, and Harden expanded upon the implications of the 
competitive exclusion principle by hypothesizing that specialized organizations have a 
competitive advantage over generalist organizations, making it difficult for generalist 
organizations to gather and retain members in a densely populated interest group system. 
In addition, the authors suggested that generalist organizations remaining in densely 
populated communities will limit their activities or specialize in those areas where they 
have a competitive advantage. The areas where these organizations realize a competitive 
advantage are likely to be those that apply to a wide range of their membership base. 
Niche theory and the competitive exclusion principle’s implications for generalist 
organizations is interesting when examining work that pre-empted Browne’s (1990) niche 
research. Salisbury, Heinz, Laumann, and Nelson (1987) employed network theory to 
distinguish the structure of the interest group communities based on alliances and 
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competition in agriculture, energy, health and labor policy. Researchers determined 
community structure by interviewing organizational representatives about their 
interactions with other groups. Within agriculture, the researchers categorized interest 
organizations as farm peak organizations, commodity groups, trade associations, or 
externality groups.  The researchers classified farm peak organizations as generalist 
groups of farmers and “their subsidiaries,” commodity groups as representing producers 
of specific crops or commodities, trade associations as “organizations of corporations not 
directly involved in agriculture,” (p. 1225) and externality groups as those concentrating 
on the effects of farm policy. They found: 1) that groups most often found their allies 
within their same organizational category; 2) that farm peak organizations more often 
identified other farm peak organizations as both competitors and allies; 3) that farm peak 
organizations were identified more often as adversaries by other organization types; 4) 
that commodity groups and trade organizations did not identify other trade associations or 
commodity groups as adversaries but often identified externality groups as adversaries; 5) 
that externality organizations were often identified as competitors by all organization 
types. Across all policy domains, the existence of dominant peak associations made 
domains more competitive. Additionally, groups with more narrow policy agendas 
avoided conflict and concentrated on cultivating support for their specific interests 
(Salisbury et al., 1987). 
 Other niche theory research within political science has analyzed the relationships 
between interest group density and the formation of new groups, including the 
assumption that interest group density can reach a maximum number of sustainable 
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groups in any given system (Chamberlain 2009). Others have focused on the relationship 
between interest group density and the mobilizing tactics of organizations, (Djupe & 
Conger 2012) and institutional dominance in communities of organized interests (Lowery 
& Gray 1998).  
At least one social science discipline other than political science has also focused 
on the activities of interest groups as restricted or determined by resource competition— 
sociology. Resource dependence theory, which is rooted in organizational sociology, 
shows similarities with niche theory and the competitive exclusion principle (Lowery et 
al., 2012). However, sociologists, especially social movement scholars, generally 
emphasize a wider array of organizational resources than political scientists and include 
among them moral, cultural, and social-organizational resources that impact 
organizational activities (Andrews & Edwards 2004; Coley 2013; Burstein & Linton 
2002).  
 For Gray and Lowery (1996), the theoretical power of the niche theory of interest 
representation is that it provides a connection between the two distinct lines of interest 
group research—group maintenance/mobilization processes and interest group influence 
on government. The theory connects and simultaneously examines interest organizations’ 
internal and external activities. They also held that examining interest group niches can 
explain the structure of interest group communities; “[interest organizations] survive—or 
fail to survive—in a highly competitive market of representation. That competition likely 
influences all of what they do, from their mobilization efforts to their lobbying activities” 
(Lowery et al., 2012, p. 37). 
14 
  
Niche Theory and Agricultural Policy 
 Certain aspects of the agricultural policy domain, lead to the inference that the 
domain would encourage niche partitioning among interest groups. First, agricultural 
policy encompasses a large number of fragmented concerns (Browne 1990). For instance, 
the seminal piece of agricultural legislation in the United States, the ‘farm bill,’ includes 
an impressively wide range of issues including commodity policies, conservation, trade, 
agricultural research, rural development, nutrition, credit, forestry, horticulture, energy, 
crop insurance, and a number of miscellaneous programs (Johnson & Monke 2013). 
Interestingly, the scope of agricultural policy has not always been so wide; Bonnen, 
Browne and Schweikhardt (1996) offer a useful overview of the changes within 
agricultural policy making processes, including its widened scope.  The high number of 
fragmented issues covered by agricultural policy would likely create natural niches for 
interest groups         
 Second, wide ranging concerns means that the agricultural domain is 
characterized by a similarly large number of actors concerned with one or a number of 
the various issues. These actors’ guiding goals for agricultural policy are often conflicting 
(Outlaw, Richardson, & Klose 2011). In addition, the diverse number of actors and issues 
within the domain creates a high “expectation of conflict” (Browne 1990 p. 483). As 
Bonnen, Browne, and Schweikhardt (1996) explained, the increasingly large number of 
actors engaged in agricultural policy processes has contributed to more conflicts and 
threats of conflict consequently immobilizing the policy making process and creating the 
need for increased effort to satisfy the range of values involved.    
15 
  
 The large number of actors in the agricultural policy domain and the high 
likelihood of conflict between them suggest that it would be beneficial for these actors to 
carve out distinct realized niches. This inference is generally supported by studies of 
density dependence and the competitive exclusion principle (Chamberlain 2009; Lowery 
et al., 2012). The niche theory of interest representation was supported by agricultural 
policy research in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s (Browne 1990; Salisbury et al., 1987).  
However, some characteristics of the contemporary agricultural policy domain 
call into question whether and how niche partitioning occurs today. In the late years of 
the 20th century, federal agricultural policies became increasingly general, which 
amplified the importance and influence of generalist interest organizations covering a 
broad range of issues (Wilson 2005). Additionally, recent research on federal rural policy 
interests indicated that generalist farm organizations wield a great deal of influence 
within federal agricultural policy processes (Reimer 2013). These groups ostensibly are 
concerned with and engaged in a wide range of issues in agriculture, casting doubt on the 
idea that specialization and narrow issue niches are necessary for interest groups to 
survive and effectively influence policy.
1
 However, Reimer’s (2013) study focused on 
                                               
 
 
 
1 Whether general farm organizations actually create narrow policy foci and niches, as suggested by the 
competitive exclusion principle, is difficult to determine because of the limited attention to agriculture and 
interest groups in political science and rural sociology.  Reimer’s (2013) research is the only study 
examining agricultural interest groups since the late 1980’s of which I am aware, other than a handful  
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rural rather than agricultural policy and does little to study the structure of the interest 
group system by examining patterns of engagement or the relationships between 
organizations.         
 Perhaps more importantly, agriculture in the United States has changed drastically 
since the late 1980’s and early 1990’s. Linda Lobao and Katherine Meyer (2001) wrote 
of the “great agricultural transition” of the 20th century, characterized by “the 
abandonment of farming as a household livelihood strategy,” (p. 104) indicated by 
declining numbers of farms, a declining farm population, greater reliance on hired labor 
in agriculture, and growth in farm acreages, sales, and real estate capitalization, trends 
that continued in the final decades of the 20th century. Further, at the turn of the 21st 
century, Frederick Buttel (2003) claimed that additional “discontinuous social forces” 
within the U.S. agro-food system continue and exacerbate the transition outlined by 
Lobao and Meyer (2001). These forces include: 1) increasingly long-distance food supply 
chains; 2) global neoliberalization in agriculture; 3) increased structural differentiation of 
farms and agriculture; 4) concentration and industrialization in livestock production; 5) 
the importance of new technologies such as genetically modified organisms and 
information systems; 6) “the relocation of agrarian protest outside of mainstream 
                                                                                                                                            
 
 
 
of studies by William P. Browne and colleagues in the 1980’s, 1990’s and 2001. (Browne, 1988; Browne 
1990; Browne 1994; Browne 1995; Bonnen, Browne, and Schweikhardt 1996; Browne 2001) Because of 
the lack of research in recent years, little is known about the structure of interest group engagement in 
federal agricultural policy and its implications for theory and practice.  
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production agriculture” (p. 185); and 7) the environmentalization of agriculture or the 
fact that, “agriculture is becoming increasingly subject to environmental criteria and 
regulations” (p. 185). These developments have undoubtedly changed both agricultural 
policy and the goals and roles of interest groups within the domain, urging a 
contemporary look at the agricultural interest group community.  
Addressing Limitations to Niche Theory  
Some scholars within the neopluralist perspective have found varying support for 
the idea that interest groups will ‘gravitate’ toward federal policy issues where little 
competition creates an issue niche. For instance, when examining the policy activity of 
interest groups using a random sample of federal lobbying disclosure data, Baumgartner 
and Leech (2001) found evidence of both issue niches and policy bandwagons. Many 
issues were engaged by only a small number of organized interests a space with little or 
no competition, but other issues saw “a firestorm of lobbying activity” (p. 1205). In 
addition, a study of interest group involvement in federal judicial nominations by 
Caldeira, Hojnacki, and Wright (2000) found similar results. The existence of policy 
bandwagons, in which a large number of organizations are active, suggests if not an 
alternative to niche theory, at least a nuance in which interest groups may not always 
partition their policy activity to create issue niches or may act outside their niches when 
advantageous.  Baumgartner and Leech (2001) and Caldeira, Hojnacki, and Wright (2000) 
present policy engagement by interest groups as dependent on factors other than the 
construction of a niche. As McFarland (2010) pointed out, some issues are engaged by a 
plurality of interests while one or a few specialized groups dominate others.  
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Further, the contemporary characteristics of agricultural policy call into question 
whether and how niche partitioning occurs in the domain. My research addresses the 
limitations with both niche theory and agricultural interest group research by examining 
the structure of the contemporary agricultural interest group community and by assessing 
the existence of niche partitioning behavior within that community. This examination will 
focus specifically on the policy engagement resource, which was emphasized by Browne 
(1990) and was found by Gray and Lowery (1997) to be a critical resource dimension. 
Addressing these limitations involves evaluating the contours of federal agriculture 
policy, including the issues and scope of contemporary agricultural policy and the interest 
groups engaging that policy.  
 The following are the specific questions that guided the research. R1 and R2 refer 
to the structure and characteristics of the agricultural interest group community, including 
policy engagement. R3 focuses on the niche creation behavior of individual 
organizations:  
R1: What is the structure of interest group participation in federal agricultural 
policy? 
- How many groups make up the federal agricultural interest group 
community?  
- What types of groups participate in the federal agricultural policy area? 
- What is the pattern of their engagement in relation to one another?  
Of particular interest in the analysis aimed at addressing these questions were the 
policy engagement activities of generalist organizations due to the implications of the 
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competitive exclusion principle. While Wilson (2005) and Reimer’s (2013) discussions 
indicated the importance of a small number of general farm organizations, when applied 
to interest groups, the competitive exclusion principle indicates that generalist 
organizations in a densely populated interest group system are likely to narrow their 
activities to only those issues where they possess a competitive advantage (Lowery, Gray, 
Kirkland, & Harden 2012). 
R2: Is the federal agricultural policy domain characterized primarily by issue 
niches?  
R3: Do the organizations that participate in the federal agricultural policy 
domain exhibit resource partitioning behavior regarding policy engagement?  
 Research by Bonnen, Browne and Schweikhardt (1996) indicates that the 
agricultural policy domain will be highly complex and densely populated due to the 
expanding range and scope of agricultural policy and shifts in Congressional rules that 
make it “more open and less hierarchical” (p. 130). Thus, regarding the structure of the 
agricultural interest group community, I hypothesized that,  
H1a: The agricultural policy domain will be densely populated and complex.  
Buttel (2003) explained that one of the major ‘discontinuities’ 21st century U.S. 
agriculture has been that agricultural reform and protest, including through the 
presentation and research of alternative policies, comes mostly from non-farm 
organizations. Perhaps this is also the case in lobbying agricultural legislation. An 
additional hypothesis regarding the structure of the agricultural interest group community 
was,  
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H1b: The majority of interest groups participating in the federal agricultural 
policy domain will be non-farm organizations.  
While the niche theory of interest representation points toward the expectation 
that the agricultural domain would be characterized primarily by niches, previous 
research by Baumgartner and Leech (2001) has shown that some federal issues are often 
engaged by only a small number of organized interests, but others see “a firestorm of 
lobbying activity” (p. 1205). This finding aligns with the neopluralist idea that interest 
group engagement depends on the issue area; some issues are engaged in by a plurality of 
interest groups and others are dominated by one or a few specialized groups (McFarland 
2010). The increasingly general nature of agricultural policy (Wilson 2005) and the wide-
reaching nature of the ‘farm bill’ lead to the inference that some issues will be engaged 
by a large number of diverse interests. An additional hypothesis regarding community 
structure and R2 included,  
H2: The pattern of agricultural policy engagement by interest groups will be such 
that issue niches and policy bandwagons exist. 
According to Gray and Lowery’s (1996) niche theory of interest representation, 
agricultural interest groups would benefit from undertaking niche partitioning behavior. 
Further, certain characteristics of the domain, particularly that it is expected to involve a 
large number of interests and that the expectation of conflict is high (Browne 1990), 
indicate that niche partitioning is likely in regards to policy engagement. But because of 
the expectation that both niches and bandwagons will exist, it is predicted that some 
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issues will encourage groups to act in a wider space. Thus, in reference to niche 
partitioning behavior it was expected that,  
H3: Interest groups in agricultural policy will exhibit niche-partitioning behavior 
regarding policy engagement.  However, certain issues will motivate groups to 
act outside their niches (e.g. policy bandwagons).  
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Chapter 3: Characteristics of the 112th United States Congress, Its Agriculture 
Committees and U.S. Agriculture 
 
112
th
 United States Congress 
“[P]aralyzed and dysfunctional.” These were the terms that the CQ Almanac 2011 
used to describe the 112
th
 Congress of the United States, expounding that, “Public 
confidence in the divided Congress reached a new low” (Austin 2012, para. 1). The 
political party divisions of each Congressional chamber are shown in Figure 1. Much 
attention during the first session of the congress focused on House Republicans, the new 
majority party in the chamber, and their efforts to repeal or thwart a number of legislative 
and regulatory efforts including healthcare reforms, environmental regulations and efforts 
to address climate change, financial services regulations, energy policies, and 
governmental spending. Congress spent the majority of the first session addressing 
financial issues, including a 2011 appropriations bill that passed mere minutes before the 
federal government would be forced to shut down many operations and raise the debt 
ceiling (Austin 2012). Because of these issues, during their first session, “Congress 
cleared only a few pieces of significant legislation, including a patent law overhaul, a 
defense authorization bill and three trade agreements” (Austin 2012, para. 9).  
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45% 
0% 
55% 
House of Representatives Party Breakdown: 112th 
Congress 
 Democrats Vacant seats  Republicans
51% 47% 
2% 
Senate Party Breakdown: 112th Congress 
Democrats Republicans Independents
Figure 1. Major Parties in the 112th Congress. Data from 
Manning (2011). 
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The second session of the 112th Congress played out quite similarly to the first 
with, “both parties spending a great deal of their time in futile battles devoted to 
disparaging their opponents and positioning themselves for the November elections” 
("Partisan Combat Prevailed in 112th, Fiscal Cliff Narrowly Avoided” 2013, para. 3). 
Again, attention was focused on House Republicans who struggled to reach united 
resolutions because of rifts between moderate and conservative party members. The 
hallmark moment of Congress’ second session came when the looming “fiscal cliff,” a 
combination of significant tax increases and broad spending cuts, was narrowly averted 
with a temporary sequester. Notable legislation passed in the second session addressed 
unemployment benefits for federal employees, reauthorization of the Federal Aviation 
Administration, surface transportation, student loan interest rates, user fees for the Food 
and Drug Administration, economic sanctions against Iran, financial disclosure for 
government officials, defense authorization, and foreign intelligence laws ("Partisan 
Combat Prevailed in 112th, Fiscal Cliff Narrowly Avoided” 2013).  
Congressional Agriculture Committees 
 The Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry is responsible for a 
wide range of legislation, including any matters relating to agricultural economics, 
research, extension services, production, and marketing, as well as crop insurance, farm 
credit, food and nutrition programs, forestry, the animal industry, the plant industry, rural 
development, and domestic and international food, nutrition, and hunger issues. During 
the 112
th
 Congress, the Senate committee was composed of 21 members and was chaired 
by Sen. Debbie Stabenow, D-MI; see Fig. 2 for a full list of members (“U.S. Senate. 
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Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry.”). In comparison, the House 
Agriculture Committee considers legislation related to agricultural economics, research, 
production, marketing, education, and price stabilization, as well as farm credit, crop 
insurance, commodity exchanges, entomology, forestry, the plant industry, inspection of 
livestock and seafood products, rural development, water conservation, and human 
nutrition. The House committee included 46 members during the 112th Congress and was 
chaired by Rep. Frank Lucas, R-OK; Fig. 2 also provides a full list of members (“U.S. 
House. House Committee on Agriculture.”). 
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Senate 
Majority Members  
Debbie Stabenow, D-MI (Chair) 
Patrick J. Leahy, D-VT  
Tom Harkin, D-IA 
Kent Conrad, D-ND 
Max Baucus, D-MT  
Benjamin Nelson, D-NE 
Sherrod Brown, D-OH 
Robert P. Casey, Jr., D-PA 
Amy Klobuchar, D-MN 
Michael F. Bennet, D-CO 
Kirsten E. Gillibrand, D-NY  
 
Minority Members  
Pat Roberts, R-KS (Ranking)  
Richard G. Lugar, R-IN  
Thad Cochran, R-MS 
Mitch McConnell, R-KY 
Saxby Chambliss, R-GA 
Michael O. Johanns, R-NE  
John Boozman, R-AR  
Charles Grassley, R-IA  
John Thune, R-SD  
John Hoeven, R-ND  
 
House 
Majority Members  
Frank D. Lucas, R-OK (Chair) 
Bob Goodlatee, R-VA 
Timothy V. Johnson, R-IL 
Steve Kind, R-IA 
Randy Neugebauer, R-TX 
K. Michael Conway, R-TX 
Jeff Fortenberry, R-NE 
Jean Schmidt, R-OH 
Glenn Thompson, R-PA 
Thomas J. Rooney, R-FL 
Marlin A. Stutzman, R-IN 
Bob Gibbs, R-OH 
Austin Scott, R-GA 
Scott R. Tipton, R-CO  
Steve Southerland II, R-FL 
Eric A. “Rick” Crawford, R-AR 
Martha Roby, R-AL 
Tim Huelskamp, R-KS 
Scott Desjarlais, R-TN  
Renee L. Ellmers, R-NC 
Christopher P. Gibson, R-NY 
Randy Hultgren, R-IL 
Vicky Hartzler, R-MO 
Robert T. Schilling, R-IL 
Reid J. Ribble, R-WI  
Kristi L. Noem, R-SD 
 
Minority Members  
Collin C. Peterson, D-MN (Ranking) 
Tim Holden, D-PA 
Mike McIntyre, D-NC  
Leonard L. Boswell, D-IA 
Joe Baca, D-CA 
David Scott, D-GA 
Henry E. Cuellar, D-TX  
Jim Costa, D-CA 
Tim Walz, D-MN 
Kurt Schrader, D-OR 
Larry Kissell, D-NC  
William L. Owens, D-NY  
Chellie M. Pingree, D-ME 
Joe Courtney, D-CT  
Peter Welch, D-VT  
Marcia L. Fudge, D-OH 
Gregorio C. Sablan, D-MP 
Terri A. Sewell, D-AL 
James P. McGovern, D-MA 
John Garamendi, D-CA 
Figure 2. 112th Congress Agriculture Committee Members. 
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 Within Congress’ agricultural committees, the 112th session was again notable 
because of work left undone. The reigning farm bill, “an omnibus, multi-year piece of 
authorizing legislation that governs an array of agricultural and food programs…[and] 
provides a predictable opportunity for policymakers to comprehensively and periodically 
address agricultural and food issues,” (Johnson & Monke 2013, p. 1) was set to expire in 
2012, but a reauthorized act was not signed into law until February 2014 (Chite 2014). 
The Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 (PL 110-246), was extended in two 
separate instances, once as a part of the “The American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012,” a 
measure to avoid the ‘fiscal cliff.’ The failure of Congress’ agriculture committees to 
produce a farm bill prior to the expiration of the 2008 version was attributed to 
disagreements surrounding the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), 
disagreements within the House of Representatives, and the failure of the respective 
agriculture committee chairs, Sen. Stabenow and Rep. Lucas, to agree to compromises 
(Ferguson 2014; "Partisan Combat Prevailed in 112th, Fiscal Cliff Narrowly Avoided” 
2013).  
U.S. Agriculture (2011-2012) 
 While it would be impossible to completely outline all of the characteristics of 
American agriculture during the 2011-2012 period, a few highlights will help provide 
context for this research, especially for the issues dominating policy processes during the 
period.           
 2011 was a prosperous year for U.S. agriculture; commodity prices, land values, 
net farm income, and the agricultural trade surplus all reached record or near record 
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highs. Crop sales in the U.S. were predicted to be greater than $200 billion for the first 
time ever, while livestock sales saw increased estimated sales of $165 billion. However, 
some of the records broken in 2011 were not so advantageous to the agriculture sector; 
weather disasters, including tornadoes, droughts, and floods, wreaked havoc across the 
country (“2011: The Year in Review” 2011).      
 The drought conditions that plagued many places across the U.S. in 2011 
worsened the following year. In 2012, almost 80% of agricultural land across the country 
experienced drought conditions, forcing the production of many crops to fall, according 
to the USDA National Agricultural Statistics Service (Wenzlau & Reynolds 2012; “Crop 
Production Down in 2012 Due to Drought, USDA Reports” 2013). In addition, prominent 
dialogue about a number of other important topics in food and agriculture continued 
throughout 2011 and 2012, including: 1) questions about the benefits of organic food; 2) 
commitments to sustainable agricultural production; 3) the increasingly important role of 
local food movements/food sovereignty; 4) the need for agricultural research and 
innovation; 5) the role of agribusiness in the food and agriculture system; 6) the safety of 
genetically modified foods, including state labeling initiatives; 7) ethanol’s role as an 
alternative to foreign oil dependence; 8) renewable energy sources; and 9) the farm bill 
(Wenzlau & Reynolds 2012; “2011: The Year in Review” 2011).  
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Chapter 4: Methods 
 
In order to examine the research questions outlined, interest groups’ agricultural 
policy engagement, via lobbying agricultural legislation, was studied at the community 
level. This information was supplemented, and organizational behavior was examined 
more closely, at the organizational level.       
 The community level analysis focused on examining the number and types of 
groups engaged in agricultural policy, the distribution of their policy engagement, the 
pattern of their policy engagement in relation to one another, and the creation of policy 
engagement niches. Secondary data was gathered for this analysis and was analyzed 
using descriptive statistics, cluster analysis and qualitative coding. The organizational 
level analysis used primary data gathered from interviews with representatives of interest 
groups to examine organizational behavior. Interview responses supplemented and 
expanded upon results from the community level analysis. It should be recognized that 
the conceptualization of policy engagement used here examines only one form of interest 
group activity and a single stage in the policy-making process, which created a 
manageable scope for this single research project. The limitation is recognized and future 
research should build on the concept.  
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  First, all federal agricultural legislation during the 112th Congress, January 5, 
2011- January 3, 2013, (“110th to Current Congresses (2007 to Present)” n.d.) was 
identified using the Library of Congress’s THOMAS database.  A database of any 
legislation during the 112
th
 Congress that was referred at any point to either the House 
Committee on Agriculture or the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and 
Forestry was compiled. Because “agricultural policy” is a broad term that can refer to 
“the principles that guide government programs that influence production, the resources 
utilized in production, domestic and international markets for commodities and food 
products, food consumption and nutrition, food safety, and the conditions under which 
people live in rural America,” (Knutson, Penn, Flinchbaugh & Outlaw 2007, p. 1), it was 
assumed that any legislation that met these conditions would be referred to either 
agriculture committee. The limitations of this assumption are addressed later.   
  Next, the interest organizations that engaged with any piece of agricultural 
legislation during the 112
th
 Congress were compiled using lobbying disclosure data filed 
with the federal government under the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 and the Honest 
Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007 (Maskell 2007).
2
 Engagement was 
operationalized as the existence of formal disclosure indicating lobbying activity on a 
                                               
 
 
 
2 In some instances, lobbying was indicated to have occurred on these pieces of legislation into 2013. These 
activities were not considered in this analysis, as they were more than likely taking place in the 113th rather 
than the 112th Congress, which only lasted until January 3, 2013. 
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piece of legislation. The limitations of this conceptualization are recognized and 
discussed in the concluding sections. Lobbying disclosure data is available from the 
Office of the Clerk of the U.S. House of Representatives and is aggregated by The Center 
for Responsive Politics. In this case, data was gathered from The Center for Responsive 
Politics. Disclosure data provides a measure of observed engagement and is likely to be 
more accurate than self-reported engagement data gathered using surveys, a benefit that 
has been recognized by other interest group researchers (Halpin & Thomas 2012). The 
compiled database included each organization and records of their lobbying, including 
the bills on which they lobbied and the intensity of that lobbying activity, or the number 
of times they reported lobbying each piece of legislation.  An n x p matrix of lobbying 
data where n was organizations, represented by all organizations that reported lobbying 
any piece of federal agricultural legislation, and p was federal agriculture legislation that 
was lobbied by at least one organization was constructed. Each piece of legislation 
represented a separate variable and engagement was measured at the interval level. 
Organizations were given a score of 0 if they did not report lobbying a bill; if they did 
report lobbying a piece of legislation, the number of times they reported that legislation 
in lobbying disclosure was recorded. Lobbying patterns and intensity were captured using 
these variables. Because all variables were measured in the same manner at an interval 
level, they were not standardized or weighted prior to running cluster algorithms. 
Cluster Analysis 
 The lobbying behavior of agricultural interest organizations was analyzed, using the 
exploratory, quantitative approach of cluster analysis. The primary goals of this analysis 
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were to examine the pattern of lobbying by each interest organization and to assess 
whether organizations created unique patterns of engagement, ostensibly a necessity for 
creating a policy niche. Because the “primary reason for the use of cluster analysis is to 
find groups of similar entities in a sample of data,” it was chosen as the appropriate 
quantitative method for this research (Aldenderfer & Blashfield 1984, p. 33). 
Specifically,  
a clustering method is a multivariate statistical procedure that 
starts with a data set containing information about a sample of 
entities and attempts to reorganize these entities into relatively 
homogenous groups. (Aldenderfer & Blashfield 1984, p. 7)  
 According to Aldenderfer and Blashfield (1984), there are seven major families of 
cluster analysis, including hierarchical agglomerative, hierarchical divisive, iterative 
partitioning, density search, factor analytic, clumping, and graph theoretic. Kaufman and 
Rousseeuw (1990) classified clustering methods into two major categories--- hierarchical 
methods and partitioning methods. Hierarchical methods construct a hierarchy of all 
cluster solutions from 1 to k or k to 1, where k is the number of cases being analyzed, by 
combining cases based on their similarity using a statistical measure of similarity or 
dissimilarity. In other words, hierarchical methods “deal with all values of k in the same 
run” (Kaufman & Rousseeuw 1990, p. 44). When using partitioning methods, the 
researcher predetermines the number of clusters to be formed. The algorithm is iteratively 
run until the ‘best’ solution of clusters is created (Kaufman & Rousseeuw 1990). 
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  When choosing the appropriate clustering method, a few issues need to be 
considered. First, iterative partitioning methods require researchers to input the number 
of clusters in the final solution prior to analysis. In exploratory research such as this, this 
requirement becomes problematic. In contrast, hierarchical methods construct a hierarchy 
of all cluster solutions from 1 to k or k to 1, depending on whether the analysis is divisive 
or agglomerative. The analysis produces a graphic representation of solutions, a 
dendrogram, which the researcher can use to choose the most appropriate cluster solution. 
In addition, a number of index measures exist to help researchers determine the most 
appropriate cluster solution. However, hierarchical cluster analysis is quite rigid; once 
cases are placed into clusters, they cannot be removed, meaning that solutions may be 
dependent on the ordering of cases in the data set (Kaufman & Rousseeuw 1990). 
 In order to address each of these challenges when clustering interest organizations 
according to their agricultural lobbying patterns, an agglomerative hierarchical algorithm, 
Ward’s method, was completed. Based on the output of that hierarchical cluster analysis, 
an iterative partitioning analysis known as kmeans analysis was subsequently run.  
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 Hierarchical cluster analysis was completed using R, while kmeans analysis was 
completed using SPSS.
3
 Tests of validity and reliability were performed, which are 
discussed further below.          
 Hierarchical Cluster Analysis: Ward’s method. Ward’s method is one of a number of 
algorithms  that can be used for hierarchical cluster analysis. Some other common 
algorithms include between-groups linkage, average linkage, single linkage, complete 
linkage, centroid clustering, and median clustering. Ward’s method was used in this 
research because it uses information from all observations, whereas other methods use 
information from only some of the observations. In addition, Ward’s method is a 
common algorithm in the social sciences (Aldenderfer & Blashfield 1984). 
4
  
 Ward’s method “optimizes minimum variance within clusters,” by adding cases to 
clusters so that the result is the minimum increase in the error sum of squares (ESS) in 
the cluster. ESS is calculated using Formula 1, where xi is the value of the i
th 
case. ESS is 
equal to 0 when the number of clusters is equal to the number of cases, which occurs at 
the first stage of analysis in an agglomerative method as used in this research  
(Aldenderfer & Blashfield 1984, p. 43).  
                                               
 
 
 
3 Some researchers have voiced concern with the validity of kmeans solutions in SPSS because the 
algorithm automatically chooses the first k cases as cluster centers, rather than choosing them randomly. In 
order to avoid issues this could create, analyses were run on data ordered both alphabetically and randomly 
and results were compared.  
4 Ward’s method was also recommended by a methodologist whose work focuses on finding groups in 
data.  
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ESS = xi
2 – 1/n(Σxi)
2  
    (Formula 1) 
 
 The outcome of the analysis, a dendrogram, is a graphical representation of the 
clustering solution. The horizontal lines of the graph indicate at what point cases were 
joined to form clusters; large distances between these points indicate greater dissimilarity. 
Thus, the number of cases appropriate for a cluster solution is judged by choosing the 
point at which a large jump in similarity indicates the joining of dissimilar clusters 
(Norusis 2008).  
 Kmeans. The algorithm used by the iterative partitioning method, kmeans analysis, 
differs from that used by hierarchical methods. Generally, iterative partitioning methods 
begin with an initial partition of the data into k clusters and the centroids of those clusters 
are calculated. Initial centroids are based on the “multivariate mean of the cases within a 
cluster” (Aldenderfer & Blashfield 1984, p. 46). Each observation is then placed in the 
cluster with the ‘nearest’ centroid. In kmeans analysis, nearness is determined using the 
dissimilarity measure of Euclidean distance, which is a measure of the geometrical 
distance between two points in space shown in Formula 2.  
 
d(i, j) =√ (xi1 – xj1) 
2 
+ (xi2 – xj2)
2 
+ … + (xip – xjp)
2 
          (Formula 2) 
 
When new observations are added to the cluster, the new centroid of the cluster is 
computed and the process is repeated until the optimal cluster solution has been reached, 
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which occurs when the clusters no longer change. Similar to Ward’s method in 
hierarchical analysis, kmeans analysis minimizes the variance with clusters (Aldenderfer 
& Blashfield 1984).  
 The output of kmeans analysis includes the cluster membership of each case, 
including their Euclidean distance from the cluster center, as well as the final cluster 
centers of each cluster among other measures that are not vital to this research. Cluster 
centers are computed as the mean for each variable within each final cluster and they 
reflect the characteristics of the typical case for each cluster (Norusis 2008).  
 Assessing Validity and Reliability of Cluster Analysis. Charrad, Ghazzali, Boiteau, 
and Niknafs (2014) indicated three basic approaches to assessing the validity of cluster 
analyses. First, clustering results can be compared to external information about the data. 
For instance, additional variable information about cases in order to compare and validate 
original cluster results (Aldenderfer & Blashfield 1984). Because collection of reliable 
and related external variables regarding lobbying behavior for this project would be 
exceedingly difficult, this technique was not used. Rather, the cluster solutions were 
assessed for their logical coherence compared to what was known about organizations 
based on coding processes, which can also be considered an external check for the 
validity of cluster solutions.             
 Charrad et al., (2008) also pointed to internal validation measures to assess cluster 
analysis results. Researchers can “use information obtained from within the clustering 
process to evaluate how well the results of cluster analysis fit the data…” (Charrad et al., 
2008, p. 2). Replication is one such method of internal validation in which researchers 
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compare cluster outcomes across multiple clustering methods. Outcomes should be stable 
across analyses (Aldenderfer & Blashfield 1984).                      
 Using a third basic approach involves statistical indices that have been developed to 
evaluate cluster analysis outcomes, including evaluating the most appropriate number of 
clusters in a data set—30 of these indices are included in an R package for evaluating 
cluster methodology, NbClust (Charrad et al., 2008). Milligan and Cooper (1985) used a 
Monte Carlo evaluation method to determine the effectiveness of these indices as 
“stopping measures.” The researchers found that the five best performing indices for 
determining the number of clusters in a data set included the Calinski and Harabasz index 
(CH index), the Duda and Hart index Je2/Je1 (Duda index), C-index, Gamma and Beale.
5
 
Each of the indices considers intra-cluster compactness and inter-cluster isolation in 
determining the optimal number of clusters, among other characteristics. Readers should 
consult Milligan and Cooper (1985), Charrad et al., (2014), Lui, Li, Xiong, Goa, and Wu, 
(2010), and Aldenderfer and Blashfield (1984) for further discussion of cluster analysis 
and validation techniques, including the methods of computing indices, which is beyond 
the scope of this discussion.  
                                               
 
 
 
5
 Gamma was not computed for the analysis because of its rather heavy computational load. After 6+ hours 
of computation, the statistic still had not been converged, so the operation was aborted.  
38 
  
 For the current project hierarchical cluster analysis was completed using the n x p 
data matrix ordered alphabetically by cases and then again with the cases ordered 
randomly. HCA results were analyzed to determine the most appropriate number of 
clusters according to the dendrogram. In addition, the CH index, Duda index, C-index, 
and Beale index were calculated in R for HCA using Ward’s method and Euclidean 
distance. Indices and HCA results were compared in order to determine the optimal 
cluster solution. Subsequently, the data was then clustered using kmeans methods 
according the appropriate value of k indicated by HCA outcome and cluster indices. 
Again, kmeans analysis was completed with the data ordered alphabetically by case and 
again ordered randomly. Each solution was evaluated for logical coherence and an 
optimal solution was chosen accordingly. Further discussion of these methods and details 
of the outcomes appears in the analysis and results section.  
Multidimensional Scaling 
 In order to quantitatively assess the dissimilarity among clusters in the final cluster 
solution, multidimensional scaling (MDS) was used to plot the clusters according to their 
final cluster centers. According to Borg and Groenen (2005),  
   Multidimensional scaling (MDS) is a method that represents 
measurements of similarity (or dissimilarity) among pairs of objects 
as distances between points of a low-dimensional multidimensional 
space…in order to make these data accessible to visual inspection 
and exploration. (p. 3)  
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 In this instance, the Euclidean distances between the final cluster centers, an output of 
the kmeans analysis, were used as dissimilarity measures. Clusters were plotted in 
relation to one another as a visual representation of their (dis) similarity. Objects that 
appear closer in the plot are more similar. MDS plots were created using the SPSS 
multidimensional scaling (PROXSCAL) command and appear in the analysis and results 
section.  
Analysis using a subsample: “Mover” bills. 
 As a method to ensure the reliability and validity of this research, specifically the 
coding that will be discussed, two policy content experts were consulted regarding coding 
schemes and general analytic methods. After review and discussion of the research, one 
policy expert indicated that some pieces of legislation may not be introduced with the 
intent to become law, but rather to send a message. The expert indicated that some bills 
could be considered “movers” and others as “markers.” A “marker” bill refers to a piece 
of legislation introduced primarily to send a message rather than be pushed forward t 
become public law. In comparison, a “mover” bill is one that is introduced with intent to 
move through the legislative process to become law. While not a perfect measure of 
whether a bill could be considered a mover or a marker, the expert suggested that often 
committee chairs or ranking members introduce bills that are meant to ‘move’ or to 
eventually become law; it was suggested that a more focused analysis be undertaken 
using these criteria. Thus, lobbying data for only pieces of agricultural legislation, using 
the same definition outlined previously, from the 112
th
 Congress that were introduced by 
a chair person or ranking member of any House or Senate committee were was gathered. 
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Committee chairs and ranking members were determined using the Congressional roll 
records on the Library of Congress THOMAS database. Descriptive statistics for this 
subsample were compiled and the data was analyzed using both hierarchical cluster 
analysis and kmeans cluster analysis according to the methods outlined previously. The 
results of the subsample analysis were compared to results of the full analysis. 
Coding 
 In order to fully address questions regarding the structure of the agricultural interest 
group community, specifically regarding what types of groups are engaged in the domain, 
the organizations that lobbied federal agricultural legislation were coded according to 
their substantive domain focus and organizational scope. Organizational information for 
all interest groups were obtained from the organization’s explanation of their mission or 
focus and their structure (e.g. the “About” or some other appropriate section on their 
website). In some instances, this focus was not available directly from the organization 
and was gathered using a reputable alternative site. Organizations were found via a basic 
Google search of the name listed in lobbying data from the Center for Responsive 
Politics.
6
  
                                               
 
 
 
6Lobbying disclosures do not always list details about the organization such as their address, specifically if 
they hired a firm to lobby on their behalf. In cases where the organization was not easily found via Google 
search or where there was a likely chance that multiple organizations may be confused, the disclosure 
forms were cross-referenced. 
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 Coding was completed using the organizational coding scheme that can be found in 
Appendix A, which was developed based on Reimer’s (2013) study of rural interest 
organizations and the titles of the 2014 Agricultural Act. Alterations were made to the 
initial coding scheme based on the suggestions of agricultural policy content experts as 
well as through an inductive process during coding, which is detailed in Appendix A 
footnotes.  
 Additionally, all pieces of agricultural legislation that were lobbied by interest 
organizations were coded according to their substantive domain focus in order to 
illustrate the scope of agricultural policy during the 112
th
 Congress. The typology of 
domains was the same that was used for organizations in Reimer’s (2013) study of rural 
interest groups and can also be found in Appendix A. The domain focus of legislation 
was ascertained using the bill title and summary available through the Library of 
Congress THOMAS database.  
 Two outside content experts who have extensive experience with agricultural policy 
checked the reliability and validity of these codes. These experts were individuals with 
multiple years of professional experience in federal agricultural policy making and/or 
implementation. They were approached because of their in depth knowledge of and first-
hand experience in the agricultural policy domain including familiarity with the 
organizations engaged in the space, agricultural issues and policies, and the policy-
making and implementation process. The initial organizational and legislative coding 
schemes were sent to the experts, along with a sample of 100 organizations and the codes 
they were assigned as well as the codes assigned to a sample of 235 pieces of legislation. 
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Experts were asked to evaluate the coding schemes and the codes that groups and 
legislation had been assigned in order to indicate any issues with the methodology. One 
expert made a few suggestions regarding the coding scheme for organizations including: 
1) splitting the environmental domain into an environment and a conservation domain 
because the federal policy arena includes a constituency of groups focused on regulatory 
environmental issues and another distinct base focused on voluntary conservation. 
However, during coding these two categories proved difficult to delineate based on an 
organization’s mission—the difference between the two groups is arguably more focused 
on organizational strategy rather than mission. Thus, environment and conservation were 
recombined into a single, mission-based domain; 2) splitting the food domain into a food 
domain focused on food safety and food processing and a nutrition domain focused on 
food assistance, nutrition programs and related topics. This change was made; 3) 
including certain farm related programs such as crop insurance, farm credit, disaster 
relief, and agricultural credit, in the farm domain rather than the finance domain. This 
change was made; 4) considering domains as not necessarily mutually exclusive because 
groups may work across domains, especially generalist organizations. However, 
determining the multiple domains in which a group works would have required knowing 
extensive details of the organizations’ policy activities. Thus, it was determined that 
choosing the domain in which the group focused most heavily based on their mission or 
similar information was sufficient to ascertain the general pattern of the types of groups 
working in the federal agricultural policy area. While the reviewers did not specifically 
point out any issues with legislative codes, some of the same concerns expressed 
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regarding organizational codes were addressed in the legislative coding scheme. 
Specifically, 1) certain farm related programs such as crop insurance, farm credit, disaster 
relief, and agricultural credit, were included in the farm domain rather than the finance 
domain; 2) the food/nutrition domain was split into a food domain focused on food safety 
and food processing and a nutrition domain focused on food assistance, nutrition 
programs and related topics. Other changes in the organizational coding scheme did not 
necessarily apply to the legislative coding scheme and were not applied. 
Organizational Interviews 
 In order to fully examine niche partitioning behavior in policy engagement and to 
supplement the information gathered based on lobbying data, interviews with 
organizational representatives examined the existence and extent of resource partitioning 
behavior at the organizational level. Interviews examined the relationships between 
organizations and the agricultural policy setting with the goal of assessing niche-
partitioning behavior.               
 Specifically, interviews were used to determine whether a relationship of conflict, 
alliance/cooperation, or competition exists between an organization and the other interest 
groups. A relationship of competition indicates niche partitioning while a relationship of 
conflict or cooperation indicates an absence of partitioning/interaction (Gray & Lowery 
1996). Please see the literature review section for details on this relationship and its 
implications for niche partitioning. While the focus of this research is on policy 
engagement, interviews took a broader view of organizations and considered multiple 
variables that were identified by Gray and Lowery (1996) as vital for the creation of a 
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viable niche, including finances, members, member benefits and policy engagement, in 
order to provide initial information regarding other resource domains. Interviews 
followed the schedule in Appendix B, which was derived from the instrument constructed 
by Gray and Lowery (1996) to examine the existence of niche partitioning in state level 
interest organizations. 
The organizations of interviewees were chosen purposively based on the output of 
the coding analysis. Twelve organizations of multiple types were approached for 
interviews, including generalist, commodity, and single issue organizations focusing in 
agriculture, rural issues, finance, and environment, in order to gain a variety of 
organizational perspectives. Interviewees were recruited via email and telephone using 
publicly available contact information and were chosen because of their involvement in 
the policy or governmental relations activities of their organization. Four interviews were 
completed with representatives of generalist and commodity agriculture organizations. 
The limitations of this small sample are recognized and discussed in the “Conclusion” 
section.  
Prior to completing these interview sessions, the interview schedule was assessed 
for ease of understanding using pilot interviews with four representatives of organizations 
dealing with agricultural issues at the state level. Again, these representatives were 
recruited via email and telephone using publicly available contact information. 
Interviewees worked with the policy or governmental relations activities of organizations. 
Pilot organizations did not necessarily lobby federal agricultural legislation or appear in 
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the data set of lobbying activity compiled, so the information from these interviews was 
not used in the final analysis.  
Interview responses were examined for patterns of responses, specifically 
reviewed were response frequencies for the closed-ended response questions and 
information from open-ended responses that supplemented the cluster analysis with 
supporting or contradictory information. Also, responses were analyzed for evidence or 
contradictions of niche partitioning behavior. According to Gray and Lowery (1996), 
“Evidence of partitioning, according to ecological theory, would indicate a state of severe 
competition over a vital resource dimension” (p. 99). Partitioning behavior would be 
evidenced by domination by key legislators, jurisdiction in one or a few committees, rare 
conflict over goals among organizations, and a structure of debate that allows avoidance 
of opponents within the domain (Gray & Lowery 1996). 
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Chapter 5: Results  
 
Agricultural Legislation During the 112
th
 Congress. 
Three-hundred and fifteen pieces of legislation were referred to either the House 
Committee on Agriculture or the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and 
Forestry during the 112
th
 Congress. Of those 315 pieces of legislation, 256 were lobbied 
by one or more organizations. This legislation will be referred to subsequently as 
‘agricultural legislation.’ The majority of agricultural legislation, over 55%, was lobbied 
by 2-4 organizations as shown in Table 1. The median number of organizations lobbying 
each piece of legislation was four, while the average number of organizations lobbying 
each bill was 12.75 organizations. The major difference between the median and average 
indicates a positive skew in the distribution of organizational engagement with 
legislation; a sizable number of bills, representing approximately 13% of all bills lobbied, 
had over 20 organizations engaged.  
Approximately 45 pieces of agricultural legislation during the 112
th
 Congress 
were considered “mover bills,” because a committee chairperson or ranking member 
introduced them. Of those 45 pieces of legislation, 39 were lobbied by one or more 
organizations. As indicated by the descriptive statistics in Table 2, the majority of mover 
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bills were lobbied by 2-4 organizations, while the median number of organizations 
registered to lobby mover bills was six.  
 
 Number of bills 
1 organization lobbying 54 
2-4 organizations lobbying 90 
5-7 organizations lobbying 42 
8-10 organizations lobbying 20 
11-13 organizations lobbying 9 
14-16 organizations lobbying  4 
17-19 organizations lobbying 4 
20+ organizations lobbying 33 
Average number of organizations lobbying each bill 13.004 
Median number of organizations lobbying each bill 4 
Maximum number of organizations lobbying any bill 517 
Table 1. Lobbying Activity on Federal Agricultural Legislation.  
 
 Number of bills 
1 organization lobbying  5 
2-4 organizations lobbying 12 
5-7 organizations lobbying 7 
8-10 organizations lobbying 2 
11-13 organizations lobbying 2 
14-16 organizations lobbying 0 
17-19 organizations lobbying 2 
20+ organizations lobbying 9 
Average number of organizations lobbying each bill 41.154 
Median number of organizations lobbying each bill 6 
Maximum number of organizations lobbying any bill 517 
Table 2. Lobbying Activity on ‘Mover’ Federal Agricultural Legislation. 
 
Coding of all legislation referred to either the House Agriculture Committee or 
the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry during the 112th Congress 
indicated that the focus of agricultural legislation during the period was on farm and  
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environmental issues. Approximately 51% of all legislation focused on these two issues 
areas. The chart in Figure 3 shows a breakdown of the domains on which agricultural 
legislation focused.  
 
 
Figure 3. Legislative Domains for Agricultural Legislation During the 112th Congress. 
 
Coding of ‘mover’ agricultural legislation during the period indicated that this 
legislation was even more focused on farm issues; approximately 44% of legislation dealt 
with farm issues. Again, the majority of ‘mover’ legislation, approximately 66%, focused 
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on either farm or environmental issues. The chart in Figure 4 shows a breakdown of the 
domains on which ‘mover’ agricultural legislation focused.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Legislative Domains for 'Mover' Agricultural Legislation During the 112th 
Congress. 
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What is the structure of interest group participation in federal agricultural policy? 
Participating Interests. A total of 1,235
7
 organizations lobbied one or more pieces 
of agricultural legislation during the 112th Congress. Table 3 details the descriptive 
statistics for the lobbying activity of organizations. The vast majority of the 1,235 
organizations lobbied between 1 and 3 pieces of legislation. The median number of bills 
lobbied was two, while the average number of bills lobbied by each organization was 
2.68. Again, the difference between the median and average indicates a positive skew in 
the distribution of engagement by organizations because five organizations lobbied 20 or 
more bills. 
 
 Number of organizations 
1 bill lobbied 616  
2-3 bills lobbied 379 
4-5 bills lobbied 104 
6-7 bills lobbied 53 
8-9 bills lobbied 28 
10-15 bills lobbied 46 
16-19 bills lobbied 5 
20+ bills lobbied 5 
Average number of bills lobbied by each organization 2.685 
Median number of bills lobbied by each organization 1 
Maximum number of bills lobbied by an organization 68 
Table 3. Lobbying Activity of Organizations Engaging Federal Agricultural Legislation. 
 
                                               
 
 
 
7
 Note that 1236 organizations appear in matrix tables, but one of those entries is a listed coalition of two 
organizations already in the data set. 
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A total of 954 organizations lobbied one or more of the “mover” pieces of 
agricultural legislation during the 112
th
 Congress. Table 4 details the descriptive statistics 
for the lobbying activities of organizations that lobbied ‘mover’ legislation. Over 60% of 
these organizations lobbied only one piece of “mover” legislation, while the median 
number of bills lobbied was one. Tables 4 details descriptive statistics for  the “mover” 
subsample of agricultural legislation.  
 
 Number of organizations 
1 mover bill lobbied 588 
2-3 mover bills lobbied  302 
4-5 mover bills lobbied 49 
6-7 mover bills lobbied 13 
8-9 mover bills lobbied 0 
10-15 mover bills lobbied 1 
16-19 mover bills lobbied 1 
20+ mover bills lobbied 0 
Average number of bills lobbied by each organization 1.681 
Median number of bills lobbied by each organization 1 
Maximum number of bills lobbied by an organization 19 
Table 4. Lobbying Activity of Organizations Engaging 'Mover' Federal Agricultural 
Legislation. 
 
When examining all of the organizations that lobbied agricultural legislation 
during the 112
th
 Congress, coding indicated that the largest percentage of organizations 
fell in the “Nutrition/Health” domain; approximately 17% of the organizations were 
categorized as nutrition or health focused. Many of these organizations were focused on 
general health, such as hospitals and pharmaceutical companies, rather than hunger 
alleviation, obesity, or food insecurity specifically. The next largest categories of 
organizational domains were farm, finance and business, and energy, representing 12%, 
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11% and 10% of organizations respectively. The chart in Figure 5 shows a detailed 
breakdown of the domains of organizations that lobbied agricultural legislation.  
The domains of organizations that lobbied mover bills were also examined to determine 
if different types of organizations focused their lobbying efforts on legislation that was 
expected to become law.  
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Figure 6 shows the breakdown of the domains where organizations that engaged 
‘mover’ legislation focused. A comparison of the two graphs indicates that generally the 
domain focus of organizations engaging ‘mover’ legislation was the same as the overall 
community.  
 
 
 
Coding of organizational scopes, or the structure of each organization, indicated 
that the vast majority of organizations were either corporations/companies, or 
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commodity/trade associations in both the full agricultural interest group community and 
the community that lobbied ‘mover’ legislation. The charts in Figure 7 and Figure 8 show 
a breakdown of organizational scopes.  
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Figure 8. Scope of Organizations Lobbying ‘Mover” Federal Agricultural Legislation.  
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Engagement Patterns: Full Analysis. The hierarchical cluster analysis of interest 
organizations was run twice to assess reliability, as discussed in the methods section. The 
alphabetical and random solutions had no apparently visible differences. The output of 
the alphabetical analysis is shown in Figure 9, with the number of clusters, k, including 
k=17, k=22 and k=27 clusters outlined. These values, representing the number of clusters 
in the solution, were determined based on the optimal cluster solutions returned by cluster 
indices, which are shown in Figure 10, as well as the dendrogram in Figure 9.  
It should be noted that the optimal k values indicated by the CH index and C-
index differed dramatically from those indicated by the Duda and Beale indices. While 
unclear, it is assumed that the difference is attributable to the variable computation 
methods for the different indices; the computation of these indices can be explored 
further by readers in Charrad et al., (2014). The optimal k values indicated by these 
indices were assessed in comparison to the dendrogram output by HCA analysis. It was 
determined that the Duda and Beale indices indicated similar solutions to the dendrogram 
interpretation. Thus the k values indicated by the combination of the Duda index, Beale 
index, and dendrogram were used in subsequent kmeans analysis. This was the case for 
both the full analysis and the analysis using a subsample of the data.  
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Figure 9. Hierarchical Cluster Analysis Dendrogram for Full Analysis. 
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Optimal Number of Clusters Determined by Internal Indices
 
Analysis using Euclidean distance and Ward’s method of hierarchical clustering 
 
Full Analysis 
CH     Duda   C   Beale     
Number of Clusters 693  17   693  27** 
Index Value  Infinite  3.1078   0  -3.201 
 
‘Mover’ Analysis  
Number of Clusters  284  8   284  8  
Index Value   Infinite  11.2268   0  1.081  
**Warning “Na’s Produced” during analysis 
 
Figure 10. Results of Internal Cluster Index Calculations. 
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Kmeans analysis was run using running cluster means and a maximum of 500 
iterations with k values of 17, 22, and 27. In order to ensure the reliability of these results, 
analyses were run with the data ordered alphabetically and again ordered randomly, as 
discussed in the methods section. Kmeans solutions were compared both within k 
solutions, to check that the randomly ordered and alphabetically ordered solutions were 
similar, and across k solutions to compare the differences among the solutions with 
variable numbers of clusters in order to ensure the appropriateness of the final cluster 
solution.              
The fewest differences between the randomly ordered and alphabetically ordered 
solutions appeared when k=22. For instance, in the k=17 solutions, single member 
clusters differed by four cases and in the k=27 cluster they differed by three cases. These 
differences are particularly important when considering that a major concern of this 
research is whether organizations exhibit distinct lobbying patterns, which would 
manifest as single-member clusters. Other differences among the multiple member 
clusters also were apparent between the alphabetical and random solutions in the k=17 
and k=27solutions. For instance, an environmentally focused cluster, appeared in the 
k=27 alphabetical solution, but not in the k=27 random solution or either k=17 solution. 
Thus, the k = 22 solution was chosen as the most optimal. Also supporting this choice 
was the qualitative logical coherence of the clusters in the k = 22 solution; clusters 
included organizations that appeared similar, at least upon cursory readings. 
There were few major differences between the alphabetical and random k=22 
solutions, however, a few notable differences between the two contributed to the 
60 
  
alphabetical solution being chosen as most optimal. The random solution indicated one 
additional single member cluster, the Agricultural Retailers Association, than the random 
solution. The association appeared as a single member cluster in the random k=27 
solution as well, but did not appear as a single member in any other clustering solutions. 
Because the appearance of the Agricultural Retailers Association as a single member 
cluster was sporadic and appeared only when data was ordered randomly, it was not 
deemed integral to the optimal solution. This distinction is important because a major 
concern of this research is whether and why organizations exhibit distinct lobbying 
patterns, as evidenced by single member clusters. An additional difference also 
contributed to choice of the alphabetical k=22 as most optimal: 
1) Many energy related organizations lobbied agricultural legislation 
during the 112
th
 Congress. Both k=27 solutions, which showed more 
detail compared to solutions with fewer clusters, included three distinct 
clusters of energy related organizations. This was also true of the k=20 
alphabetical solution and matched what would be expected after 
examining the raw data. However, the k=22 random solution included 
only a single cluster of energy related organizations, while the 
alphabetical solution showed similarity to the more detailed solution 
with two distinct energy related clusters.  
While choosing an optimal cluster solution is an important part of this analysis, 
the differences among these solutions were, after considering the complexity of the 
agricultural interest group community, less vital than one might realize. While detail is 
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important, this research is significant because it outlines the major patterns across the 
entire agricultural interest group community, patterns that are visible in the optimal 
cluster solution and many of the other solution alternatives. Another major significance 
of this research is that it analyzes the groups that show distinct lobbying patterns, which 
were largely similar across solutions.  
The cluster visualization in Figure 11 shows the results of cluster analysis on the 
full data set when k=22 and data was ordered alphabetically. The size of the central 
bubble indicates the relative cluster sizes based on the number of organizations in each 
cluster. The descriptor in the central bubble relates the substantive focus of the bill with 
the highest mean value in the final cluster center.8 While some cluster descriptors are the 
same, the pattern of lobbying by cluster members on other pieces of legislation was likely 
meaningfully different. The organizations placed directly above the central bubble are the 
closest, in terms of their Euclidean distance dissimilarity measure, to the cluster center; 
thus, they are the most representative of the lobbying characteristics of cluster members. 
9
 
Labels on the visualization correspond to labels on additional data visualizations to allow 
for a fuller understanding of engagement patterns by comparing across visualizations.  
                                               
 
 
 
8 It should be noted that the variable with the highest mean value for the final cluster center may not 
represent a bill that was lobbied by all cluster members, but that which was lobbied the most intensely by 
members of the cluster. In most cases, the highest mean variable in the final cluster center was legislation 
lobbied by all members of the cluster, but in a few instances this was not the case. 
9 For readability, the cluster visualization shows only the 20 most central organizations in the three largest 
clusters. The central bubble of these clusters indicates total cluster membership.  
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Figure11. Full Analysis Cluster Visualization.             Continued 
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Figure 11. Continued. 
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Figure 11. Continued. 
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Figure 11. Continued. 
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The bipartite graph in Figure 12 shows individual cluster members and the 
agricultural legislation they lobbied during the 112
th
 Congress. Each of the white nodes 
along the center represents agricultural legislation. Colored nodes represent organizations 
and are colored according to their cluster membership. Organization nodes are connected 
to the legislation they lobbied during the 112
th
 Congress. The graph visually represents 
patterns of lobbying in a complimentary manner to the cluster visualization in Figure 11; 
Figure 12 illustrates the general patterns of lobbying across the entire interest group 
community as well as the lobbying patterns of individual clusters. The goal of this 
visualization is to reveal general patterns and should not be read for details.  
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Figure12. Bipartite Graph of Agricultural Interest Group Lobbying. 
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Finally, the MDS plots for clusters based on the full analysis is shown in Figure 13; the 
plot shows a visual representation of the dissimilarity among the final clusters in the full 
analysis, allowing a further understanding of the clusters that exhibit unique lobbying 
patterns. 
 
Figure 13. Full Analysis Multi-Dimensional Scaling Results. 
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Engagement Patterns: ‘Mover’ Analysis. The hierarchical cluster analysis of 
interest organizations for the subsample of data considered “mover” bills was run twice 
to assess reliability, as discussed in the methods section. The alphabetical and random 
solutions had no visible differences. The output of the alphabetical analysis is shown 
below, highlighted at k=8. The k value was determined based on the optimal cluster 
solutions returned by cluster indices, which are shown in Table 3. As the dendrogram in 
Figure 8 indicates, k=8 is quite similar to what would be deduced based on the 
dendrogam alone.  
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Figure 14. Hierarchical Cluster Analysis Dendrogram for 'Mover’ Analysis. 
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Thus, kmeans analysis was completed using running means with a maximum of 
500 iterations and k= 8. Kmeans analysis was completed on the subsample of data 
ordered alphabetically and again ordered randomly, as discussed in the methods section.  
The alphabetical and random solutions for the subsample of data showed multiple 
similarities as well as a few major differences. First, the alphabetical solution indicated 
only one single member cluster, the National Farmers Union, while the random solution 
returned two clusters, adding Safari Club International to the single member clusters. 
Interestingly, in the alphabetical solution, Safari Club International was the most distant 
case from the cluster center in the cluster where it was included, indicating that it was the 
most dissimilar organization from the case representing the average characteristics of 
cluster members. The other major differences in the two solutions included: 1) a four 
member cluster of dairy organizations and a six member cluster of meat and livestock 
organizations were included in the alphabetical solution, but not in the random solution; 
2) a large 49-member cluster was included in the random solution, while the same cases 
appeared to be subsumed into the largest cluster (744 members) in the alphabetical 
solution; 3) the most central cases in the cluster of food and beverage companies differed 
slightly across the two solutions while the membership sizes were slightly different (11 
members compared to 7 members); 4) the most central cases in the cluster of finance and 
energy organizations differed across the two solutions and the membership sizes were 
slightly different (45 members versus 53 members); 5) the most central cases in the 
clusters of communications organizations differed and the number of members in the 
clusters varied slightly (10 compared to 14 members).  
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One of the major concerns in this research is single member clusters, which 
represent organizations with ostensibly distinct lobbying patters. Because the random 
solution differentiated an additional single member cluster—the appearance of which was 
supported in the alphabetical solution—it was chosen as the most optimal solution. 
Again, the choice of the random versus alphabetical cluster solution was viewed as 
making little difference to overall conclusions regarding patterns in the domain.  
The cluster visualization in Figure 15 shows the results of clustering analysis on 
the ‘mover’ subsample of data using the optimal k=8 random solution; the visualization is 
constructed similarly to the full cluster visualization in Figure 11.
10
 Figure 16 also shows 
a bipartitie graph for the subsample of data similar to the bipartite graph for the full data 
set in Figure 12. Labels on the visualization correspond across visualizations to allow for 
a fuller understanding of engagement patterns through comparisons. 
                                               
 
 
 
10
 For readability, the cluster visualization shows only the 20 most central members in the two largest 
clusters. The central bubble of these clusters indicates total cluster membership. 
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The multi-dimensional scaling plots for clusters based on the full analysis is 
shown in Figure 17; the plot shows a visual representation of the dissimilarity among the 
final clusters in the ‘mover’ analysis, allowing a further understanding of the clusters that 
exhibit unique lobbying patterns.  
 
Figure 17. ‘Mover’ Analysis Multi-Dimensional Scaling Results. 
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Do the organizations that participate in the federal agricultural policy domain exhibit 
resource partitioning behavior?  
Interviews were completed to examine the niche partitioning behavior of interest 
groups engaged in federal agricultural policy. Only those interviews completed with 
organizations included in the set of interest groups lobbying federal agriculture 
legislation, four organizations, are discussed here.   
According to Gray and Lowery (1996), “Evidence of partitioning, according to 
ecological theory, would indicate a state of severe competition over a vital resource 
dimension” (p. 99). The authors claim that partitioning behavior would be evidenced by 
domination by key legislators, jurisdiction in one or a few committees, rare conflict over 
goals among organizations, and a structure or strategy of debate that allows avoidance of 
opponents.  
Policy Engagement Setting. Three out of four interviewees indicated that it is 
“sometimes true” that only a few key legislators make decisions that really matter in the 
agricultural policy area, while only one interviewee stated that this was rarely the case. 
When asked to indicate to what extent it is true that legislative jurisdiction over issues in 
agricultural policy area is restricted to one or a few committees, two respondents 
indicated the statement was often or sometimes true, while a third agreed that the area 
was restricted to a few committees. A fourth interviewee indicated that this statement was 
rarely true. Interviewee comments regarding legislative jurisdiction are illustrative:  
The vast majority [of agricultural issues] is in a few, but…I’m going to 
state rarely only because I’ve learned over time that there are obscure 
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issues that touch on our industry and that happen in committees that are 
not routinely monitored.  
These responses indicate mixed results for the idea that the agricultural policy 
engagement setting is structured to involve only a few main legislators and committees. 
Thus, the structure of engagement in the agricultural policy domain is not necessarily one 
that encourages conflict.  
Policy Engagement Behavior.  However, when examining the policy engagement 
behavior, interviewees indicated that intense conflict occurs at least a portion of the time 
within the domain. Two respondents indicated that the statement, “The agricultural policy 
area is marked by intense conflict and disagreement over fundamental policy goals,” is 
often true, while two others indicated that it is sometimes true. The presence of conflict, 
at least a portion of the time, indicates that partitioning behavior is weak.  Further 
supporting that partitioning behavior is weak in the agricultural domain were responses 
indicating that organizations faced the same opponents over time (3 sometimes, 1 often), 
that they faced direct opposition when lobbying their positions (1 always, 3 often), and 
that they often cooperated with other organizations (2 always, 2 often). These responses 
indicate that both competitors and allies interact within the domain.   
 Some interviewees indicated that competition with other organizations was issue-
dependent, rather than always consistent across the overall agricultural domain. They 
indicated that the organizations that are considered competitors vary according to the 
issue at hand. Further, one interviewee indicated that both competition and cooperation 
can occur between two organizations; in other words, a competitor is sometimes a 
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cooperator and vice versa. Thus, partitioning, if it occurs in regards to policy 
engagement, is not necessarily a static concept.       
To further examine the existence of partitioning on policy engagement, 
respondents were instructed to choose between statement pairs to best describe their 
organization’s strategy when faced with real or potential competition for influence in a 
policy area. The statements read: “We work hard to make sure that we are a major player 
on all issues relevant to our policy concerns; OR We cooperate with our competitors by 
letting them take the lead on some issues, while we take the lead on others. OR Neither.” 
Three out of the four respondents chose the second statement, which Gray and Lowery 
(1996) indicated as an ‘active partitioning’ strategy in which “the competitor is 
recognized while partitioning is taking place” (p. 107). Again, interviewees’ detailed 
responses were illustrative. As one interviewee explained, their organizations’ strategy 
was likely a combination of both the first and second statement, but that, 
 There are certain things that may be of a higher priority to other organizations that 
isn’t as high of a priority for us, so we’re happy to let another group take the lead, 
but we always make our presence very well known—yes, we’re here and we’re 
willing to help out. But…we do work in coalition a lot…there is a lot to keep up 
with, so you…have to prioritize. 
These responses, contrary to earlier statements, indicate that active partitioning is 
likely taking place in the domain.  
Perhaps more important to this limited analysis of whether niche partitioning 
occurs in the federal agricultural domain, were responses to inquiries about 
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organizations’ methods of choosing and prioritizing the issues they lobby. All four 
organizational representatives referenced input by or consideration of their membership 
when choosing the issues they engage; three of the four incorporated direct input by their 
members through a grassroots process. The responses of two interviewees offer some 
useful insight.  
…We put issues through a couple of primary filters. We look at how broad 
the impact of the issue on our members. We look at…what is our realistic 
capacity as an organization to have impact. And…frankly on a practical 
level, we look at, do our members care enough about the issue and the 
possible impact to support our working in that space. 
Another interviewee explained that after a grassroots process, organizational staff 
review the impact that issues will have on members, the likelihood that action that affects 
the policy will take place, and the potential for the organization to impact the outcome of 
the policy.  
When the same interviewee was asked about competition for members, they 
explained that when their membership overlaps with that of another organization,  
We attempt in that case to engage, cooperate, coordinate. We attempt, 
from an issue management standpoint…to avoid…competing with each 
other. 
Taken in conjunction, these interview responses indicate that evidence of niche 
partitioning behavior on policy engagement is mixed, but likely takes place to an extent. 
Policy engagement is strategized largely on the policy’s impact on organization members. 
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Membership. These findings point to the fact that members drive policy 
engagement, so perhaps membership is an area where organizations seek to create a 
niche. Gray and Lowery (1996) indicated that members are one of the resource domains 
where organizations may seek to partition niches. Interviewees in this research indicated 
mixed responses to whether competition for members exists in the federal agricultural 
policy space. Respondents indicated that individuals often could be members of multiple 
organizations specializing in different areas, so competition was not necessarily a useful 
descriptor of the situation. Additionally, when asked to indicate whether their strategies 
when faced with competition for members aligned with a resource conflict or active 
partitioning method—using a statement pair similar to the one discussed previously—
three out of four respondents indicated neither strategy. Thus, while members play an 
integral role in the policy engagement strategies of organizations, membership is not an 
area where organizations work to create a viable niche.     
 Perhaps creating a niche in the membership area is more of a concern for new or 
emerging interests rather than those that are established; this facet was not examined in 
this research, but could be considered in future interest group research.   
Additional resource domains were inquired about during interviews, including 
finances, and member benefits, but because the focus of this research was policy 
engagement, these responses fell outside the scope of this project.  
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Chapter 6: Discussion 
 
A major goal of this research was to characterize the federal agricultural interest 
group community and to understand based on quantitative data who participates and how 
the participate in the domain. But first, it is fitting to answer the question—how was 
federal agricultural policy characterized during the 112
th
 Congress of the United States?  
The legislation that was referred to either Congressional chamber’s agricultural 
committee during the 112
th
 Congress was mostly legislation that dealt with farm and 
environmental issues. Over half of all bills referred to either of the congressional 
agriculture committees was considered in one of the two domains, which focused on 
issues from marketing programs for commodities and crop insurance to federal lands and 
pesticide regulation, among many others. The remainder of all agricultural bills were split 
among energy, food, nutrition, rural development, finance, government and other issues. 
The smallest category of legislation dealt with rural development. It is important to note 
that a number of the issues considered in the “other” domain were workforce 
development or border protection measures. Thus, the scope of agricultural policy, while 
encompassing a vast range of issues, is largely focused on agricultural production and the 
environment. This finding supports Bonnen, Browne and Schweikhardt’s (1996) 
assertion that the scope of agricultural policy has widened to encompass a wide range of 
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issues with a caveat; the focus of the domain remains overwhelmingly on agricultural 
production and the environment. These findings also show tentative support Buttel’s 
(2003) thesis regarding the ‘environmentalization’ of agriculture. However, it should be 
noted that Buttel (2003) was referring particularly to environmental regulation with the 
concept and the legislation characterized as focused on the environment here was wider 
ranging that simply environmental regulation of agricultural production. Appendix A 
details the coding of legislation.  
‘Mover’ agricultural legislation, which included approximately 45 bills, was even 
more focused on farm issues than the set of all agricultural legislation. As in the full 
analysis, the majority of ‘mover’ issues fell into the farm and environment domains, 
again supporting the idea that the domain remains focused on agricultural production and 
the environment, despite also considering a range of other issues.  
It is interesting to note that very few of the bills that were referred to either the 
House Agriculture Committee or the Senate Committee on Agriculutre, Nutrition and 
Forestry were signed into public law. Only five of the 315 bills became law, which is 
perhaps not surprising considering characterizations of the 112
th
 Congress as stymied by 
political battles.  
Agricultural Interest Group Community Structure 
How Many and What Types of Groups Participate? As expected based on 
Hypothesis 1a (H1a), the federal agricultural interest group community encompasses a 
large and diverse set of actors. Over 1,200 unique organizations engaged agricultural 
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legislation during the 112
th
 U.S. Congress. In addition, a large number of these same 
organizations, 954, lobbied one or more pieces of ‘mover’ agricultural legislation.  
The organizations making up the federal agricultural interest group community 
ranged from health companies to generalist farm groups and every imaginable interest in 
between. Of particular interest is that the majority of organizations did not focus in any 
one domain. Rather, the domain areas of the over 1,200 organizations were split across 
many domains including farm issues, development and infrastructure, food, nutrition, and 
others. Approximately 17% of the organizations focused on nutrition and health, 
representing the largest single set of interests in the community. Many of these 
organizations were hospitals and health systems accounted for largely by engagement on 
workforce development measures that sought changes to Medicare. As expected based on 
Hypothesis 1b (H1b), only approximately 13% of organizations were considered “farm” 
organizations, meaning the majority of interests were non-farm organizations. These 
findings offer an expansion of Buttel’s (2003) assertions that agricultural protest is 
pushed largely by non-farm organizations; agricultural legislation is lobbied largely by 
non-farm organizations.    
Turning to the scope of organizations that engaged federal agricultural policy, the 
overwhelming majority of interests were either commodity/trade associations or 
corporations/companies, split almost evenly between the two. First, this finding mirrors 
the assertion of other scholars that over time interest organizations have increasingly 
represented specific rather than broad interests (Reimer 2013). As early as 1980, scholars 
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pointed out that, “Some see the strength and influence shifting from general farm 
organizations to commodity groups because of their ability to be specific and research the 
issues” (Guither, 1980 p. 163). The current research shows that general organizations that 
represent broad based interests, such as general farm or rural interest organizations are 
relatively rare in the agriculture domain. However, while there are relatively few of these 
groups, they are also highly active compared to other organizations. When compared to 
other organization types, generalist organizations were the most active. In addition, of the 
five organizations that lobbied the most agricultural bills, four were generalist 
organizations. Further, the most active organizations on ‘mover’ bills, or those that 
lobbied more mover bills than all other organizations were exclusively generalist farm 
organizations. Table 5 compares the median number of bills lobbied by each organization 
type.  
 
Organization Scope Median Number of Bills Lobbied 
Generalist 4 
Commodity/trade associations 2 
Single issue 2 
Corporation or company 1 
Academic or research institution 1 
Government 1 
Table 5. Median Number of Bills Lobbied by Types of Organization. 
 
Compare this information to the implications of niche theory’s competitive 
exclusion principle, which holds that generalist organizations remaining in a densely 
populated interest group system are likely to narrow their activities to those issues where 
they possess a competitive advantage (Lowery, Gray, Kirkland, & Harden 2012). This 
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research suggests that generalist organizations have not narrowed their activities 
compared to other types of organizations in the agricultural domain. Rather, generalists in 
agriculture exhibit a wider range of policy engagement.  However, rather than directly 
conflicting with the competitive exclusion principle a wider range of activities may 
contribute to the competitive advantage of generalist groups. Generalist organizations are 
likely to have a larger and more diverse membership base than other organizations and so 
by engaging those issues that impact their members, as interviews suggested was the 
case, they engage across a wider range of issues. Whether their wider activity range 
impacts generalists’ ability to be influential compared to other organizations is a question 
for future research.  
Engagement Patterns. Results of cluster analyses indicated that the lobbying 
patterns of the majority of interest groups in the federal agricultural domain were quite 
similar. These findings answer the sub-research question, “What is the pattern of [interest 
groups’] engagement in relation to one another?” and have bearing on Hypothesis 2.  
Over 1,000 of the 1,235 organizations in the domain were placed in the same 
cluster when examining the full data set. This was also the case in the ‘mover’ analysis, 
in which 702 of the 954 organizations were placed in the same cluster. Thus, the 
agricultural interest group community engages the policymaking process in an 
overwhelmingly similar pattern.  
This does not indicate that policy engagement niches are not created, but very few 
of the 1,235 interest groups in the domain exhibited unique lobbying patterns. In the full 
analysis, only 11 organizations appeared as single member clusters whose lobbying 
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pattern was unique. Examination of the multi-dimensional scaling plots for the full 
analysis provides further support for this conclusion. Many of the clusters in the plot 
were grouped in close proximity to one another, indicating similarity. However, certain 
clusters including V1, V2, V8, V11, V15, V13, V7 and V9, appeared further from the 
central grouping in the plot, indicating that they showed more dissimilarity from the other 
clusters. Indeed these clusters corresponded to single-member or niche organizations.  
The list of organizations that created a policy engagement niche in the full 
analysis includes a number of easily recognizable, or prominent, national organizations. 
Those groups were: 1) American Municipal Power, Inc.; 2) CropLife America; 3) Dairy 
Farmers of America; 4) General Motors; 5) Humane Society of the US; 6) National Cable 
and Telecommunications Association; 7) National Farmers Union; 8) National Grid; 9)  
NumbersUSA; 10) Safari Club International; 11) US Chamber of Commerce.    
The results of the ‘mover’ cluster analysis also indicated very similar results to 
the full analysis; only a very small number of organizations created niches. In the 
‘mover’ analysis, the MDS plot indicated that clusters were more dissimilar than those in 
the full analysis, likely because they included many more groups on average. Again, 
those clusters that were the most dissimilar—or were a further distance from others in the 
plot,—corresponded to the single-member niche organizations along with a 14 member 
cluster focused on a tax relief and job creation. In the sub-analysis of ‘mover’ bills, only 
two organizations created single-member clusters. These organizations were also noted as 
niche organizations in the full analysis: 1) National Farmers Union; 2) Safari Club 
International.  
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These niche organizations lobbied multiple and sometimes many pieces of 
legislation; all lobbied more bills than the average of 2.69 per organization. In fact, two 
of the unique, single-member organizations were among the most active of all 
organizations in the data set and five organizations lobbied ten or more bills.  All of the 
niche organizations also reported a high lobbying intensity, meaning that they reported 
lobbying bills on multiple disclosures or over an extended period of time; disclosures are 
filed quarterly. 
The range of interests represented by these niche organizations is highly variable 
and includes broadly focused farm and business organizations, commodity producers, 
immigration interests, animal rights, conservation, energy, manufacturing and 
transportation, and communications. The organizations are also variable in their scopes; 
they represent corporations, single issue organizations, generalists, and trade associations. 
It does not appear that a specific type or interest focus is more likely to have created a 
policy engagement niche. 
In addition to the findings related to the research questions and hypotheses 
outlined early in the research process, a few other notable conclusions regarding the 
structure of the agricultural interest group community arose. First, while the large number 
of environmentally focused bills shows tentative support for Buttel’s (2003) 
environmentalization thesis, the number of environmental organizations that engage 
agricultural legislation is quite low; only 4% of groups that lobbied in the domain were 
focused on environment and conservation. Based on this mismatch, a few inferences can 
be contemplated: 1) the environmetnalization of agriculture may be occurring largely on 
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the part of legislators rather than interest groups, 2) the small number of environmental 
interest groups are quite successful at influencing legislation, 3) the push for greater 
environmental regulations on agriculture comes from policy engagement outside of 
lobbying, such as grassroots mobilization.  
Second, the extent of engagement by corporations or companies seen in this 
research was somewhat unexpected, but corporations turned out to represent a major 
segment of the interests lobbying federal agricultural legislation. The influence of 
corporations, and more directly the extent of their spending on lobbying political 
processes, has been the subject of much public scrutiny (Porter 2015; Allison & Harkins 
2014), with one media writer evening titling a recent piece, “How Corporate Lobbyists 
Conquered American Democracy” (Drutman 2015). From a sociological perspective, this 
finding is of interest based on theories of the contemporary relationship between the state 
and capital. The modern era is characterized by globalization, neoliberalization, and 
hyper-moblie capital, leading to the claim that, “Corporate bypassing of nation-states was 
paralleled by neoliberalization of nation-states, which further weakened their power to 
regulate” (Bonnano 2014, p. 8; Bonnano & Constance 2006).  In fact, Bonanno and 
Constance (2006) pointed out that there are three major lines of thinking that guide 
scholars’ thoughts on the relationship between the state and capital in the modern era 
including, 1) that the state is powerless to control, regulate and even react to transnational 
corporations; 2) while the state does not dominate capital, it is not powerless in the face 
of capital; 3) the state may be facing a crisis in the modern era, but it has some ability to 
“resist globalization forces.” A case study by Bonnano and Constance (2006) indicated 
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support for all three of these perspectives while a separate study by Sharp and Deemer 
(2014) indicated that the relationship may be contradictory but it is premature to conclude 
that the state is powerless in the face of capital. While this research did not begin with the 
intent to explore such a concept, it becomes apparent from the heavy involvement in 
lobbying agricultural legislation by capital interests that capital has not completely 
bypassed the state. This leads to the logical assumption that the state does in fact retain 
some kind of power to regulate, control, or influence capital because capital interests are 
engaged in making sure their interests are represented during the policy-making process. 
If the state is powerless against capital, then arguably capital interests would see no need 
to engage the policy-making process.      
 Finally, the awareness that some legislation is introduced solely to send a message 
while some is intended to end its journey as a law is what prompted the suggestion of an 
agricultural policy expert to separately analyze legislation that was introduced by 
committee chairs. The idea behind such an analysis was that organizations may engage 
bills differently on the basis that they are more likely to become public law. The overall 
patterns of engagement on ‘mover’ agricultural legislation showed few meaningful 
differences from the engagement in the agricultural domain generally. Thus, engagement 
patterns are not necessarily driven by the likelihood of action being taken on a bill. While 
the likelihood of action is an important consideration, as indicated by at least one 
interviewee, these considerations seem to be nuanced rather than a function of some 
overarching strategy.   
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Is the Federal Agricultural Policy Domain Characterized Primarily by Issue 
Niches? 
 While there are a number of groups involved in the federal agricultural domain, 
the vast majority of those interests engage in a limited fashion. Almost half of the interest 
organizations in the domain lobbied only a single bill and approximately 80% lobbied 
three or fewer bills. Further, the majority of agricultural legislation that was lobbied at all 
was lobbied by only one to four organizations. On the other hand, some bills—
approximately 33--were engaged by 20 or more organizations. When turning to the 
‘mover’ analysis, a similar pattern appears. The majority of organizations lobbying 
‘mover’ bills lobbied only one such bill, while a small number of ‘mover’ bills created a 
frenzy of engagement.  
Similar to the findings of Baumgartner and Leech (2001), and supporting 
Hypothesis 2 (H2), these findings indicate that the agricultural domain is characterized 
simultaneously by policy bandwagons and policies with little interest group competition, 
or issue niches. This finding aligns with the neopluralist idea that engagement is 
dependent on the issues at hand; some issues are engaged by a plurality of interest groups 
while one or a few specialized groups dominate others (McFarland 2010). Cluster 
analysis, which indicated that only a small handful of interests create unique engagement 
patterns and ostensibly policy engagement niches within agriculture, provided further 
support for H2 from the organizational perspective.   
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Examining the characteristics of agricultural bills that were lobbied by the most 
organizations can give some insight into the nature of policy bandwagons within the 
domain. The five bills engaged by the most organizations in the full analysis were:  
 1) H.R. 3630 “Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012” 
 2) S. 3240 “Agriculture Reform, Food and Jobs Act of 2012” 
 3) H.R. 6083 “Federal Agriculture Reform and Risk Management Act” 
 4) H.R. 872 “Reducing Regulatory Burdens Act of 2011” 
 5) H.R. 1573 “To facilitate implementation of title VII of the Dodd-Frank 
  Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, promote 
 regulatory coordination, and avoid market disruption”  
When turning to the ‘mover’ analysis, bandwagon bills were largely the same as 
those in the full analysis; the five bills lobbied by the most organizations differed by only 
one bill across the two analyses, indicating that one of the characteristics of bandwagons 
is that they are ‘mover’ bills. Out of the above list, only H.R. 872 above was not 
considered a ‘mover’ bill.  
The first three of the overall bandwagon pieces of legislation are omnibus bills 
that include various titles or subsections and touch a number of subjects or programs with 
wide ranging impacts. For instance, H.R. 3630 addressed both Social Security and 
Medicare (“Congress Extends Jobless Benefits” 2013). S. 3240 and H.R. 6083 were farm 
bill versions that encompassed 12 titles and programs ranging from agricultural research 
to crop insurance and nutrition assistance. While H.R. 1573 and H.R. 872 were not multi-
title pieces of legislation, they did touch on programs or issues that arguably have wide 
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reaching impacts—commodity futures and securities exchanges and pesticide use under 
the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act and the Clean Water Act, 
respectively.             
Insights into how or why issues become bandwagons or niches can be informed 
by interview responses regarding the ways that organizations decide which bills to 
engage. All interviewee respondents indicated that their membership is either directly 
consulted or heavily considered when choosing and prioritizing issue engagement. 
Respondents that offered further detail indicated that their organizations consider the 
issue’s potential impact on members, members’ willingness to support engaging the 
policy, and their organizations’ capacity to impact the policy. Thus, it is logical that 
omnibus agricultural legislation received the most attention—it’s impact on multiple 
programs and/or programs that are wide reaching, such as nutrition assistance, Social 
Security, crop insurance, and other programs as evidenced by the omnibus legislation 
during the 112
th
 Congress, are most likely to impact large swaths of the population and 
create an impetus for action.  
In light of the fact that agricultural issues are both sparsely lobbied and engaged 
by a plethora of interest organizations, the question of whether pluralism exists in the 
domain can be viewed from multiple perspectives. If the question rests solely on whether 
a variety of interests engage, then this research shows that it is heavily dependent on the 
issue. Omnibus issues tend to be lobbied by a wide variety of interest groups, sometimes 
hundreds of organizations, quite intensely. On the other hand, approximately 18% of 
agricultural legislation during the 112
th
 Congress was not lobbied at all, while over 40% 
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was lobbied by only a single organization. The median number of organizations lobbying 
each bill was just one. Of the bills that became public law, the same mixed results appear. 
One of the eventual laws, H.R. 3630 “Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 
2012,” was lobbied by over 500 organizations; this was also one of the bills that included 
a number of provisions for high impact programs. However, two of the bills that became 
law were lobbied by three or fewer organizations, while the final two were not lobbied at 
all. All of these findings combined indicate that debate over a large number of 
agricultural bills was either non-existent or engaged by only one perspective; in these 
cases, issues were arguably not informed by a plurality of interests.      
Niche Partitioning: Does it occur in the federal agricultural policy domain?  
Quantitative assessments of niche partitioning through descriptive statistics and 
cluster analysis, as discussed in reference to H1 and H2, indicated that very few interest 
organizations in the agricultural domain successfully created policy engagement niches; 
only a handful of the organizations in the community exhibit unique lobbying patterns 
allowing them to occupy a distinct space to the exclusion of other organizations. Virtually 
all of the interests engaging federal agricultural policy exhibit similar lobbying patterns 
overall.           
 Qualitative methods were used to further examine whether niche partitioning 
occurs in the agricultural domain and results in this analysis were also mixed. First, 
interviewees indicated mixed evidence for the idea that the agricultural policy 
engagement setting is structured to involve only a few main legislators and committees 
indicating that the structure of engagement in the domain is not necessarily one that 
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encourages conflict. This makes a great deal of sense when considering the nebulous 
nature of agricultural policy—policies that impact agriculture could range from economic 
market regulation to environmental conservation measures, nutrition assistance programs 
and many areas in between.  
When it came to their relationships with other organizations, interviewees 
indicated that both conflict and cooperation among organizations occurs in the domain 
but that they take on an active partitioning strategy when faced with competition, 
indicating both support and contradiction for resource partitioning behavior on policy 
engagement. Interviewees indicated that relationships of cooperation and competition are 
dependent on the issue at hand pointing to the idea that niches and their creation may be a 
dynamic rather than static concept.  
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, interviewees indicated that their 
organizations choose and prioritize their issue engagement largely based on direct input 
by members or consideration of their members’ needs.  
Taken comprehensively, interview responses indicate mixed results for the 
existence of niche partitioning behavior in the federal agriculture domain, showing mixed 
support for Hypothesis 3a (H3a). These results are somewhat aligned with patterns seen 
in cluster analysis results in which a portion of organizations have carved out unique 
niches, but the vast majority have not.  
Thus, while niche partitioning appeared in the agricultural policy domain in 
research in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s (Browne 1990; Salisbury et al., 1987); it 
appears that the contemporary agricultural policy domain is characterized by mixed 
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rather than strong niche partitioning on policy engagement. Rather than groups exhibiting 
unique issue engagement patterns, the majority of groups exhibit largely the same pattern. 
While Brown (1990) found in interviews that agricultural interest groups had narrow 
issue foci, avoided committing to coalitions, and minimized issue based interaction, 
interviews in this research did not indicate such behavior. Rather, organizations indicated 
that they often work in coalition and that competition and cooperation was issue 
dependent. And while organizations in the domain did engage generally with only a few 
pieces of legislation, this does not necessarily indicate that their organization has a  
overall narrow focus because lobbying activities outside of the agriculture domain were 
not examined.  
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Chapter 7: Conclusions 
 
 
This research began as a practical and theoretical inquiry into the structure of the 
contemporary agricultural interest group community and ended by outlining useful initial 
information and understandings of the community. The project has explored theoretical 
questions about whether pluralism exists in agricultural policy making processes, whether 
agricultural interest groups create policy engagement niches, and how the competitive 
exclusion principle plays out in the domain. From a practical perspective, the project 
examined the agricultural interest group community to assess such questions as who 
participates, what is the manner of their participation, and how is agricultural policy 
characterized at the end of the first decade of the 21
st
 century?  
Quantitative analysis using lobbying disclosure data and qualitative analysis using 
primary interviews lead to a few important conclusions.  First, agricultural policy during 
the 112
th
 Congress encompassed a variety of issues but the domain while widened, 
continues to have a strong focus on agricultural production and the environment. These 
findings tentatively support that the domain is subject to ‘environmentalization,’ or at 
least attempts at ‘environmetnalization.’ However, this conclusion is limited, as much of 
the environmental legislation in the domain did not necessarily increase regulation on 
agricultural production, but dealt with wildfire issues or even attempted to repeal 
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environmental regulations on production.       
 Second, the federal agricultural interest group community encompasses a large 
and diverse set of actors across a variety of interests. In fact, multiple times in the course 
of gathering data for this project the sentiment, “Wow, there is an interest group for 
everything,” crossed my mind. Buttel (2003) previously pointed to the increased 
involvement in agricultural protest and reform from non-farm interests, claiming that 
movements for change mostly come from interests that are not farm groups. When it 
comes to formal engagement in the agricultural policy making process, this trend is also 
manifested. In addition, this research indicated that a large number of corporations or 
companies engaged the federal agricultural policy-making process, adding to the rural 
sociological dialogue around the relationship between capital and the state (Bonnano & 
Constance 2006; Sharp & Deemer 2014). Specifically, these findings point to the fact that 
capital has not completely bypassed the state and that the state presumably does retain 
some kind of power to regulate, control, or influence capital, at least in the agricultural 
space.            
 Third, most of the organizations that engage federal agricultural policy are more 
specialized than general, which was expected based on the fact that the interest group 
community has moved toward more specific than general interests since the 1960s 
(Reimer 2013).  General organizations that represent broad based interests, such as 
general farm organizations or rural development organizations, are relatively rare in the 
domain. However, in general, the generalist groups that do engage agricultural legislation 
are also highly active. When compared to other organization types, generalist 
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organizations were the most active, suggesting that they have not narrowed their 
activities compared to other types of organizations in the agricultural domain. This 
finding initially points to the fact that if generalist organizations are abiding by the 
competitive exclusion principle of niche theory, they are not necessarily doing so by 
severely limiting their activities compared to other types of organizations.  
 Fourth, while there are a number of groups engaged in the federal agricultural 
domain, the vast majority of interests engage in a limited fashion on very few bills. 
Further, the domain is characterized simultaneously by policy bandwagons and issue 
niches, aligning with Baumgartner and Leech’s (2001) findings and the neopluralist 
concept that some issues are engaged by a plurality of interest groups while others are 
dominated by one or a few specialized groups (McFarland 2010). These findings indicate 
mixed support for the existence of pluralism in the domain. 
Fifth, cluster analysis showed that patterns of engagement by the overwhelming 
majority of interest groups in the agricultural domain were similar. In addition, very few 
of the 1,235 organizations in the community exhibited unique lobbying patterns carving 
out unique policy engagement niches. Further, interview responses indicated mixed 
results for the existence of niche partitioning behavior in the federal agriculture domain. 
These results indicate that niche partitioning on policy engagement occurs on a limited, 
mixed basis in the contemporary agricultural domain.  
Finally, interview responses indicated mixed results for the existence of niche 
partitioning behavior in the federal agriculture domain, aligning with patterns of lobbying 
101 
  
in which a portion of organizations carved out unique niches, but the vast majority did 
not.  
Limitations 
The research and thus findings are limited by a few factors. First, agricultural 
policy is a widely encompassing term referring to “the principles that guide government 
programs that influence production, the resources utilized in production, domestic and 
international markets for commodities and food products, food consumption and 
nutrition, food safety, and the conditions under which people live in rural America” 
(Knutson, Penn, Flinchbaugh & Outlaw 2007, p. 1). Agricultural policy in this research is 
somewhat narrowly defined as any legislation, proposed or acted upon, referred to 
Congressional agriculture committees during the 112
th
 Congress. This narrow definition, 
while useful for providing a manageable universe for a nebulous concept, leaves out 
agricultural policies that are not legislative.       
  Additionally, while the legislation referred to Congressional agriculture 
committees has some connection to or impact on agriculture, it may also be connected to 
a number of other industries and policy domains. Agriculture is inextricably linked to a 
number of other areas such as finance, health, and many others. Because of this, an 
organization could appear in this database while having only a tangential relationship to 
agriculture. Disclosure data does not have to indicate the particular stance of an interest 
organization or the specific titles or portions of legislation they lobbied. Thus, the 
universe of interest organizations gathered here may be somewhat inflated, but any effort 
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to tease apart these ties and eliminate tangential organization could lead to potentially 
harmful or uninformed distinctions. In addition, some issues that impact agriculture may 
have been addressed by additional committees and may not have been referred to either 
agriculture committee. These issues would have been missed here. However, it was taken 
on good faith that if a piece of legislation impacted agriculture it was referred to either 
the House Committee on Agriculture or the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, 
and Forestry, and that all those pieces of legislation that were referred to these 
committees can safely be considered “agricultural policy.”      
 The data used to examine policy engagement only includes formal lobbying 
activities on legislation. However, formal lobbying is only one type of activity that 
interest organizations use to try to influence policy and government, while the legislative 
process is only one stage of the policy-making and implementation process. Other 
interest group activities aimed at influencing government can include public campaigns, 
generating evidence and advice, grassroots mobilization, political action committees, 
public campaigns, direct contact, direct action, and even litigation (Jones 2011; Fiorina et 
al., 2004). Additionally, the legislative process is not the only stage of the policy-making 
process that interest organizations endeavor to influence. Issue framing and rule making 
are just a few of the policy stages that are missed by this research. The limited scope of 
this single project should be addressed by future research.     
 By using federal legislation acted upon in any way by Congressional committees, 
this research may have missed some important contemporary agricultural issues where no 
legislation was proposed, debated, or passed during the period. However, it is likely that 
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the most salient, wide reaching issues facing agriculture in 2011 and 2012 are included in 
proposed legislation. Additionally, the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 makes data on 
formal lobbying of legislation easily available and provides a measure of actual 
engagement that skirts issues of self-report data that has been used in some political 
science research (Halpin & Thomas 2012). As such, lobbying disclsoures were viewed as 
a useful measure for examining policy activity.       
 It must be acknowledged that the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 and its 
updates refer to ‘professional lobbyists’ and only require lobbying disclosure under 
specific circumstances, including: 1) an organization’s total expenses for lobbying during 
a quarter exceed $10,000 or a firm registering on behalf of a client receives income for 
lobbying related matters for that client exceeding $2,500 in a quarter; 2) the lobbyist 
makes more than a single lobbying contact and spends greater than 20% of their total 
time for the organization or client on ‘lobbying activities’ during the quarter (Maskell 
2007). These thresholds mean that there is a possibility that some small interest 
organizations may not have been identified and examined. Nonetheless, all of the major 
interest organizations that engage in policy processes are likely to be identified using this 
data.           
 Additionally, the time period chosen for this research could be limiting, as it will 
exclude issues that were not prominent during the period.  Interest organizations that 
were uninterested in the range of issues being addressed by policy makers or were 
dormant for a number of reasons will also be left out of this analysis. Nevertheless, the 
period was chosen because it provides a useful boundary to data collection as the most 
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recently ending U.S. Congress when the research project began.   
 Interviews with organizational representatives were subject to standard concerns 
with the validity of self-report data. Interviews also admittedly included a very small 
sample size of respondents that does not lend itself to capturing large patterns of 
partitioning behavior in the agricultural policy domain. However, interviews were chosen 
as the best method to further examine niche partitioning behavior because they allowed 
for more detailed and nuanced responses than surveys. In addition, interviews are a 
beginning component to comparative case studies, which Gray and Lowery (1996) 
argued are most appropriate for studying niche partitioning behavior. However, 
additional interviews and full case studies were not feasible for the scope of this research 
and should be addressed in future studies.  
Finally, this research will not generalize to domains outside of agriculture, such as 
healthcare. It is possible that agricultural policy represents a unique case for a number of 
reasons outlined previously. Because of this limited generalizability, this research has 
limited ability to address niche theory overall. However, it does address niche theory’s 
applicability to the agricultural domain and can further the understanding of the 
agricultural policy domain in general.   
Future research 
Arguably on of the most important contribution this research makes to scholarly 
dialogue is to provide an initial description of the contemporary agricultural interest 
group community that provides benchmarks and a starting point for further examination 
as well as a methodology for assessing the community. Many of the findings here 
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motivate further questions, such as whether the patterns observed in this research differ in 
other stages in the policy making process and other methods of influencing government, 
whether and how these patterns have changed over time, how engagement differs 
according to issue areas, the impact and importance of other resource dimensions, and the 
ever present question of whether and how these activities translate to influence, among 
others. In order to begin answering these questions and furthering the scholarly 
understanding of federal agricultural policy processes, researchers can build on this 
research in multiple ways.  
First, this research looks at a single slice of the agricultural policy making process 
during a specific period, lobbying legislation during the 112
th
 U.S. Congress. Future 
research can offer a deeper understanding of the agricultural interest group community 
through expanding the specific portion of the federal policy process and period under 
examination.  
For instance, comparisons with other policy domains such as health, labor, and 
others could assess whether the community of interests engaging agriculture policy is 
unique among federal policy domains. Do other domains create engagement by a 
similarly large and diverse set of actors? In addition, formal lobbying is only one method 
of attempting to influence policy and government and the legislative process is only a 
single stage of the policy-making process. Future research should expand these analyses 
to include other methods of engaging the policy making process, such as grassroots 
mobilization or generating evidence and advice. In addition, future research should also 
examine other stages of the policy making process, such as issue framing, appropriating 
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funds and rule-making to name a few. These future analyses could determine how 
engagement occurs through other strategies and how engagement strategies shift 
according to the stage of policy-making.   
In addition, the time span examined here could be widened to include multiple 
Congressional sessions that would allow comparisons of the interest group community 
over time. Scholars could distinguish whether and how the community has substantively 
changed and if larger trends appear in those changes. Time-lapse visualizations of the 
community could illustrate these changes for wide audiences. In addition, scholars could 
incorporate a widened time dimension to future studies in order to examine the 
progression of bills and how engagement changes as bills move toward becoming a 
public law—federal legislation can change in many ways from the time it is introduced or 
referred to a committee until it is signed into law. An analysis that examines the policy 
making process in reverse, identifying public laws and tracing engagement as they moved 
through the policy making process, could offer insight into whether and how 
organizations alter engagement as policies progress.  Finally, time can be incorporated to 
further this analysis by examining new or emerging organizations compared to well-
established organizations to determine if and how their policy engagement patterns differ. 
It would be reasonable to wonder whether these organizations use meaningfully different 
strategies for influence and survival; future research could assess whether this is the case.  
Further sub-analyses of the current data could also be useful to develop a deeper 
understanding of agricultural policy making processes and how organizations engage that 
process. For instance, cluster analyses could be completed separately for legislation 
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within each domain area such as farm issues or environmental issues. These analyses 
could determine the characteristics of interest groups that engage a specific subset of 
issues compared to other issues areas and the domain as a whole.  In addition, the current 
project could be extended to examine only the agricultural legislation that became public 
law during the 112
th
 Congress. This analysis could act as an alternative illustration to the 
“mover” analysis that examines whether engagement differs based on the likelihood that 
legislation will become public law.  
This research focused on niche creation within a single resource dimension—
policy engagement. As Gray and Lowery (1996) pointed out, “an organization’s niche is 
defined by a multidimensional space, not simply its place of interface with the policy-
making process” (p. 95). While further examination of other resource dimensions was 
outside of the scope of this project, this research can provide a useful starting point for 
scholars to begin examining additional resource dimensions. The methodology used 
here—quantitative analysis of secondary, objective data-- could be applied to other 
dimensions. The policy engagement information developed in this project could be used 
as a starting point for detailed organizational case studies aimed at understanding 
partitioning behavior and activities on a variety of resource dimensions simultaneously.  
As a method of examining additional resource dimensions and further probing the 
role of capital in state processes, finances could be studied through lobbying expenditure 
records. This data could be analyzed on its own or added to the existing policy 
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engagement data in order to create a deeper understanding of organizational resources 
across interest groups. An examination of lobbying expenditure, particularly by 
corporations or companies, could also offer an expanded and purposeful look at the role 
of capital in the federal policy-making process in order to further the rural sociological 
literature regarding the relationship between the state and capital.  
Finally, it is vital that readers understand that this research did not address the 
question of whether groups influenced agricultural policy processes, only the ways that 
they engaged the process. Future research is needed to address questions of influence, for 
instance, by examining organizational behavior and stances compared to policy 
outcomes. Future research could build on this study by examining: 1) which groups are 
most likely to be influential and whether they correspond with those that exhibit unique 
patterns of lobbying; 2) if engagement on a bandwagon issue is useful for influencing 
outcomes from an individual interest group perspective; 3) the influence of generalist 
organizations compared to other types of organizations.        
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Appendix A: Coding Schemes 
 
Organizational 
Domain  
Definition/Example Code 
Farm Focus on agricultural (including horticulture, aquaculture, 
forestry, and fishing) producers or production practices including 
associations that represent multiple supply chain segments if it is 
noted that the producer or grower is represented or included, 
(including vertically integrated processors and grower 
cooperatives that market food products because of their interest 
in agricultural production); farm/commodity/crop programs; 
agricultural inputs manufacturing or retailing (pesticide/chemical 
regulation falls under “environment” domain); producer income 
protection programs; commodity marketing programs; beginning 
farmer and rancher programs; food/agriculture promotion and 
programs including advertising programs for specific 
commodities and organizations that promote local food 
production; agricultural trade promotion or enhancement; 
agricultural World Trade Organization related issues; agricultural 
production and policy research; crop insurance; disaster 
designation; disaster relief on private lands; agricultural credit; 
forestry and forest products as business enterprises including 
paper, (when the focus is on forest conservation, included in 
“conservation” domain); biotechnology; veterinary health and 
concerns; domestic animal issues including health, rights, and/or 
welfare during production, slaughter, or research or as pets 
(wildlife focused groups are included in “environment” domain) 
1 
Table 6. Organizational Domain Coding Scheme.     Continued 
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Table 6. Continued. 
Environment & 
Conservation 
Issues related to environmental health including pollution, water 
quality, EPA activity, pesticides and pesticide regulation, pest 
management/control or suppression; Conservation/preservation or 
responsible resource-use or management related to animals, plants, 
land or the environment and its resources; farmland conservation 
programs; hunter rights or advocacy; public lands programs; 
outdoor industry; historic preservation; focus on responsible 
resource use/management 
2 
Manufacturing General manufacturing, fabrication, or materials science such as 
chemical manufacturing or chemistry focus; steel industry, steel 
extraction and processing; natural resource extraction. Companies 
that note primary or majority activities in manufacture of 
agricultural chemicals or inputs are included in “farm” domain, 
pharmaceutical or healthcare manufacturing related are included in 
“nutrition & health” domain, petrochemical focus is included in 
“energy” domain, and construction/transportation manufacturing is 
included in “infrastructure/development” domain 
3 
 
Energy Energy or petrochemical production, generation, or exploration such 
as oil, gas, coal; energy or electricity/energy providers (including 
joint electricity and water providers); bioenergy/biomass/biofuels; 
renewable energy; mining or extractive industries for providing 
energy; energy conservation 
4 
Food Food and beverage processing, manufacturing, or retail, including 
components of food and beverages such as oils and sugars 
(including vertically integrated food and beverage processors that 
include production, such as Tyson Foods, unless those processors or 
marketers are grower cooperatives, which are included in “farm” 
domain because of their grower focus); livestock processing 
(livestock production concerns fall under “farm” domain); 
foodservice; consumer interests regarding food; food safety 
production certifications, processing or  
inspection of food and agriculture products, recalls, labeling, GE 
food safety and labeling 
5 
Continued 
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Table 6. Continued. 
Nutrition & 
Health
11
  
Nutrition and hunger alleviation or assistance; food insecurity; 
obesity; general health and medicine including medical advocacy, 
medical education, disease and disability advocacy and/or 
education, hospitals, and medical technology providers, 
manufacturers, or managers 
6 
Development & 
infrastructure
12
 
Infrastructure and transportation, especially in rural areas; 
engineering and construction; economic development; 
transportation and logistics including air, rail, and water 
transportation manufacturers, operators, employees, and suppliers; 
housing and real estate, including affordable housing development 
for low-income residents; community and community economic 
development including rural development; residential/commercial 
heating and cooling; engineering and construction; public water 
agencies or water utility providers (organizations that advocate for 
responsible water usage are “conservation” organizations whereas 
those that provide water as a utility or agricultural input such as 
irrigation are infrastructure) 
7 
          Continued 
 
                                               
 
 
 
11 After suggestions from an agricultural policy content expert, the food domain was split and a nutrition 
domain was added as a number of groups focus on nutrition assistance. As coding was completed, a large 
number of organizations that were more general health based were also discovered, so the domain was 
expanded to include general health interests. 
12 The development and infrastructure domain was originally characterized as rural development. The 
category was expanded to include groups focused on development of communities and infrastructure in 
general, rather than only those that noted a rural focus. Some, but not a majority of organizations, in this 
category noted a rural focus. 
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Table 6. Continued. 
Finance & 
business 
Insurance (not specified as crop insurance, organizations that note a 
specialization in crop insurance or agricultural finance are considered 
in “farm” domain, all others, including health insurance are included 
here); accounting; trading; investment; general economic or business 
interests; financial consulting; government spending, taxes and tax 
systems; Commodities Futures Trading Commission; Securities 
Exchange Commission; employee compensation and benefits; 
commodities and securities exchange; general human resource 
management; general trade concerns (noted foci on agricultural trade 
are included in “farm” domain); government watchdog groups in any 
of these areas, such as taxes, are included in “Government/Rights” 
domain 
8 
Government 
& rights 
Governmental associations, government employee or public servant 
associations (police, firefighters, city/county/federal employees); 
political party or ideology focus; civil and human rights; concerns 
with government systems, such as the justice system, legislative 
system, public policymaking and lobbying, postal service, 
immigration system (including immigration reform organizations) 
etc.; representatives of foreign governments and interests of other 
governmental organizations, including Native American tribes; U.S. 
government entities such as cities and counties, law enforcement and 
military issues including veterans and merchant marines and 
veterans’ advocacy groups; government “watchdog” organizations 
9 
Education & 
research
13
 
Focus on education, educational issues, and research or science that 
does not fall into another category or falls into multiple categories; 
organizations that note a research focus in a specific domain, such as 
agriculture, nutrition, or research and teaching hospitals, are included 
in their respective domains.  
10 
Continued 
 
                                               
 
 
 
13 The education/research domain was added as coding was completed and a number of research institutes 
and academic institutions, among other education focused advocacy organizations, were categorized. These 
organizations did not fit appropriately into an existing category, so this domain was added.   
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Table 6. Continued.  
Information 
technology & 
communications 
Data retrieval, transmission, storage, and/or manipulation; 
software or software development; data measurement or testing 
tools; communications and telecommunications based 
companies or organizations such as wireless and broadband 
providers or supporters; network infrastructure such as 
satellites; mass media companies; broadcasting; publishing, 
including communications based companies with a marketing 
component 
11 
Other
14
 Organizations that do not fall into one of the other designations, 
including law firms; general labor unions; senior citizens; gun 
rights and education; logistics and distribution; satellite 
industry; home/beauty retailers or manufacturers; intellectual 
property; general consumer interests; consulting firms; 
entertainment industry; abortion; tobacco processing/tobacco 
products manufacturers; religious focus; human services or 
poverty focus (e.g. self described as charities or social work—
does not note a focus on human or civil rights, which would be 
included in “government/rights” domain); aerospace and 
defense; family issues;  think tanks; conglomerates or 
corporations with major operations across multiple domains 
12 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
 
 
 
14 After initially coding all organizations, the “other” category included a large number of organizations 
that showed similarities, including information technology related organizations and manufacturing and 
related industries such as natural resource extraction. Thus, an information technology domain was added, 
which was expanded to include related interests that were included in the development and infrastructure 
code, such as communications and telecommunications interests. 
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Organization 
Scope  
Definition/Example  Code 
Generalist 
organization 
Broad based and multiple interests within one or multiple domains 
such as agriculture, environment, ‘democracy,’ civil rights and 
wellbeing, or business 
1 
Commodity, 
trade, or member 
association
15
  
Concerned with the interests or promotion of a single commodity, 
industry or professional group and represent individuals from that 
group such as producers, service providers, professionals, etc. and 
can include associations, employee organizations, cooperatives and 
mutual companies, unions, coalitions, consortiums, or federations  
2 
Single issue 
organization 
Focus on only a single issue within a single domain, such as 
encouraging sustainable agricultural practices or protecting water 
resources and can be member organizations, but are not focused on 
the concerns of a trade/profession/or area as an industry and can 
include consortiums, associations of organizations or federations. 
Includes organizations that note that they are non-profits focused on 
a specific mission. 
3 
Corporation or 
company 
Private firms and public corporations or federations/consortiums of 
companies – for profit, non-member  
4 
Academic or 
research 
institution  
Public or private university; research institutes or think tanks  5 
Government
16
 Government agency or body 6 
Table 7. Organizational Scope Coding Scheme. 
 
 
                                               
 
 
 
15
 Check-off type programs that are focused on advertising and increasing demand for a specific 
commodity are considered commodity organizations because they are focused on promoting a single 
commodity in order to help producers and others in the supply chain, even though they are not member 
organizations. 
16
 The government category was added as coding was completed and a number of government agencies, 
such as local, state and tribal governments, or organizations concerned specifically with government 
processes and functions, such as policy think-tanks or immigration interests, were categorized. These 
organizations did not fit appropriately into an existing category, so the domain was added.   
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Legislative 
Domain  
Definition/Example Code 
Farm Focus on agricultural, including horticulture, and aquaculture, 
producers, production, and/or commodities; farm/commodity/crop 
programs including commodity storage; agricultural inputs 
manufacturing or retailing; producer income protection programs; 
commodity marketing programs; beginning farmer and rancher 
programs; local food/agriculture promotion and programs; 
agricultural trade promotion or enhancement, including related to 
World Trade Organization issues; agricultural research/extension 
and land grant universities and including related matters; 
agricultural credit; Livestock Marketing Fairness Act amendments; 
farm bill versions or amendments to multiple titles of the Food, 
Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008; production of and 
purchaser/licensing agreements for genetically engineered or 
modified biotechnology (not related to food safety, labeling, or 
other consumption aspects of GE, which are included in the “food” 
domain); crop insurance; disaster designations; disaster relief or 
assistance on non public lands (issues on public lands are 
considered in the “environment” domain); animal rights/welfare 
during production and slaughter including amendments to the 
Animal Welfare Act; forest products classifications 
1 
Environment Conservation related to air, water, land, plants, or any other aspect 
of the environment; hunter rights or advocacy; issues related to 
environmental health including pollution, clean air, clean water, or 
other areas; Environmental Protection Agency activity; forest 
conservation programs; public land designations/permits/programs 
including grazing permits (e.g. National Forest programs and 
Bureau of Land Management issues); pesticide regulation; biomass 
not for energy production (e.g. biobased manufacturing); Plant 
Protection Act amendments; farmland conservation programs; pest 
control; wildfire protection; outdoor recreation and related issues; 
greenhouse gas emissions 
2 
Table 8. Legislative Domain Coding Schemes.    Continued 
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Table 8. Continued. 
Energy Energy production, generation, or exploration including hydraulic 
fracturing; energy or utility provision issues; bioenergy and biomass 
for energy production; renewable energy; rural energy programs 
(including those on public lands); energy market regulation was 
included in the finance category  
3 
Food Food processing, manufacturing, or retail (including animal slaughter 
when not related to humane treatment/welfare); consumer interests 
regarding food; food safety production certifications such as organic 
certifications; processing or inspection of food and agriculture 
products; food recalls; food labeling; genetic engineering or 
modification and food safety or labeling  
4 
Nutrition Nutrition and hunger alleviation or assistance; emergency food 
assistance; healthy food access initiatives; food insecurity; obesity 
prevention; school food programs (except where these programs are 
included in a larger bill related to agricultural production promotion 
such as local and community agriculture); when nutrition programs are 
also included in general “welfare reform” with multiple provisions 
unrelated to nutrition, the legislation is included in the “other” domain  
5 
Rural 
development  
Service provision including cable/internet/broadband in rural areas 
(rural energy programs are included in the “energy” domain); rural 
designations; rural well-being; rural economic development 
6 
Finance  General insurance; securities trading; investment regulation; benefits 
issues; general economic interests; tax issues; Commodities Futures 
Trading Commission and Securities Exchange Commission; 
commodities exchange; securities exchange 
7 
Government Transparency initiatives; agency or department creation, combining, 
renaming, closure/relocation of offices, or sharing of resources; 
government spending/budgets; amending or authorizing agency or 
official duties (unless that authorization falls into another code such as 
trade, research, environment, or farm); general trade (if trade 
legislation focuses specifically on agriculture, it is included in “farm” 
domain; legislation can also include other areas, but must note a focus 
on agricultural trade)  
8 
Other Legislation that does not fall into one of the other designations, 
including border protection and border security infrastructure 
initiatives for public safety promotion; immigration and alien status; 
foreign aid; veterans affairs; tribal affairs; unemployment assistance 
and workforce investment; general safety net assistance and “welfare 
reform” that include multiple provisions that are not nutrition focused, 
and general “rebuilding America” acts; medical/general health 
initiatives not related to nutrition; manufacturing product inspection; 
transportation development that does not focus on rural areas or needs 
9 
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Appendix B: Interview Schedule 
 
To Specialize or Not to Specialize?: Niches, Interest Groups and Federal 
Agricultural Policy 
Interview Schedule  
 
1. The formal mission statement of my organization is:  
 
 
2. Which of the following categories, in reference to organizational scope, best 
describes   your organization?  
 
a. Generalist organization   b. Commodity or trade association   c. Single issue  
organization  
 
Please indicate to what extent the following statements are true.  
 
3. In the agricultural policy area, there are only a few key legislators who make 
decisions that really matter.  
a. Always true  Often true  Sometimes true  Rarely true  Never 
true  
b.  If always or often true, who were these legislators during the 112
th
 
Congress?  
 
4. Legislative jurisdiction over issues in the agricultural policy area is restricted to 
one or a few committees. 
a. Always true  Often true  Sometimes true  Rarely true  Never 
true 
b. If always often true, what are these committees?  
 
5. The agricultural policy area is marked by intense conflict and disagreement over 
fundamental policy goals.  
a. Always true  Often true  Sometimes true  Rarely true  Never 
true 
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6. In making our case in the agricultural policy area, we repeatedly face the same 
opponents on each issue that comes up.  
a. Always true  Often true  Sometimes true  Rarely true  Never 
true 
 
7. In lobbying federal legislatures, how often do you find yourself in direct 
competition with other organizations opposed to your position?  
a. Always  Often    Sometimes    Rarely   Never 
 
i. If always, often or sometimes, please list up to five organizations 
that opposed your organization during 2011 and 2012.  
 
 
8. In conducting your lobbying activity with the federal legislature, how often do 
you consult, communicate, or cooperate with other organizations sharing your 
goals that are also engaged in lobbying the federal legislature?  
 
a. Always  Often   Sometimes   Rarely  Never  
 
i. If always, often, or sometimes, please list up to five organizations 
with whom you consulted, communicated, or cooperated during 
2011 and 2012.  
 
9. When choosing the issues on which your organization lobbies, how does your 
organization choose and then prioritize those issues?  
 
10. Please explain how your organization formulates its policy stances.  
 
 
Resources  
 
11. 9. Are there organizations nationally with broadly similar purposes with whom 
your organization competes for new members?  
 
Yes  No 
 
a. If yes, how frequent would you say this competition is for members?  
 
Continuous   Occasional   Rare  
 
b. Please list up to five organizations with whom your organization competes 
for members: 
 
127 
  
12. Who can be a member of your organization? OR What group or population does 
your  organization represent?  
 
13.  Is there a specific population your organization targets for gathering new 
members?  
 
 
14. Are there organizations nationally with broadly similar purposes with whom your 
organization competes for funding? 
 
Yes   No 
 
a. If yes, how frequent would you say this competition is for funding? 
 
Continuous   Occasional   Rare 
 
b. Please list up to five organizations with whom your organization competed 
for funding during 2011 and 2012: 
 
 
15. What are your organizations’ major funding sources?  
 
 
16.  Are there organizations nationally with broadly similar purposes with whom your 
organization competes for other resources such as staff members, public support, 
or information? Please indicate the resources:  
 
Yes   No 
 
a. If yes, how frequent would you say this competition is for other resources? 
 
Continuous   Occasional   Rare 
 
b. Please list up to five organizations with whom your organization competed 
for other resources during 2011 and 2012: 
 
**Only for organizations that lobbied on farm bill versions  
 
17. Our previous research indicates that your organization lobbied on versions of the 
2014 farm bill. Were there titles of the farm bill that your organization prioritized 
as more important than others?  
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Farm bill titles include: commodities; conservation; trade; nutrition; credit; rural 
development; research, extension and related matters; forestry; energy; 
horticulture; crop insurance; miscellaneous.  
 
For each of the following statement pairs, which statement best characterizes your 
organization’s strategy when faced with real or potential competition for influence in a 
policy area with other organizations? 
        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
